[tptacek]

These are arguments, but I don't really understand what they're arguments for. At issue here is whether or not the IETF should document usage of pure-MLKEM TLS. There are environments where people are going to use pure-MLKEM TLS, whether Bernstein likes it or not. His argument is that the IETF should pretend that isn't happening, and throw up weird procedural obstacles to it.

[chrismorgan]

I know approximately nothing about the specific case here, and don’t believe I have any skin in the game. I intended my comment purely abstractly: I’m not commenting on anything technical, merely mentioning a procedural concern: that the line I quoted can sound reasonable, but that I don’t think it’s actually a reasonable argument by itself, because of the likely consequences of such actions. (That is: if that happened to be the only argument—though I doubt it is—there’s a compelling case for rejecting it.)

[g-b-r]

If it's documented it will be implemented by many more libraries and applications, that's the argument

[tptacek]

It already exists. In fact, there are environments where it has to exist. So the argument he's making is that the IETF should pretend it doesn't exist.

[g-b-r]

Can you (or someone else) please give some example of those environments?

[some_furry]

Telecoms.

I wrote at length about this debate in my blog post about threat modeling: https://soatok.blog/2026/06/30/soatoks-informal-guide-to-thr...