sandboxing, which feels a weird way to achieve that. Although the reason for it to begin with is because builds systems can typically access raw memory and disable artificial restrictions.
I think this is a bad move since the real fix to these attacks is a sandboxed environment rather than a single tool implementing sandboxing.
These are not mutually exclusive, and one makes the other better. "Whole process" sandboxing has always been far worse than native sandboxing because when the devs writing the software design the software to be sandboxed they can achieve far more fine grained permissions. Similarly, "whole environment" sandboxes are the absolute worst - they're the least fine grained possible.
The benefit of "whole environment" is that if you stuff everything into that environment then anything in it is confined, but it's all confined with everything stuffed in and is sort of maximally capable. You can rarely do things are significant as, say, system call filtering, because all software in the environment must continue to work and none of it was designed with that in mind.
Native sandboxing like this will likely make auditing much easier as well. If a dependency requires something like "give me the ability to execute code on the OS", now it has to ask for it and now it gets additional scrutiny.
Native sandboxing is and always will be the infinitely superior method when it's actually used. Whole process/ Environment is only what we use because of how rare native sandboxing is.
How would you do it, then? Sandboxing a project's build.zig via Wasm (and the various dependencies's build.zig files) seems like a great improvement to me and is how I would personally try to sandbox the build process.
I don't know what build.zig commonly does, but in Rust build.rs often does things like compiling C/C++ libraries, so you can't sandbox it with WASM (contrary to proc macros, which most of the times can be compiled to WASM and there were/are efforts for that). How does Zig fare with that?
Even if they end up with a "this dependency can execute arbitrary code" it'll be a huge win because that will be an explicit grant to that dependency. You'll be able to know "which of my dependencies execute arbitrary code?" and encourage most of them not to. In rust, you can know this but it's going to be "basically all of my dependencies can do it" because somewhere they'll use a build script/ proc macro.
I don't know Zig's plan, but once you have the ability to broker privileges like this you have the ability to audit the privileges being brokered and things change forever.
I assume the compiler(s) do not run in WASM. Just the build script. The build script just orchestrates the compilers. So you can run any compiler that the build script is given access to, so compiling C/C++ or potentially any other language shouldn’t be an issue.
In theory, you could run the whole compiler (including C) in WASM as well but I don’t think that’s the goal? You kinda need to trust the compiler itself.
Use containerized development systems: bwrap (my favorite), devcontainers.json, isolated server, anything really. You can't protect yourself against malicious vscode extensions with a zig build system sandbox.
It makes more sense when you view sandboxing as enabling project correctness in the presence of skilled, fallible maintainers rather than preventing explicit attacks. Solutions for the former do a lot to thwart attacks from the latter, but attack prevention (especially with the form of "just another sandbox") is unlikely to help with the former.
Zig build scripts are arbitrary zig programs, so sandboxing those scripts is a Good Thing. Wasm might be overkill, but using something off-the-shelf that's specifically designed for sandboxing untrusted code is definitely the right approach.
I see no benefits in sandboxing such things as build systems. Sooner or later one eventually needs to execute some external code, like a shell script or cmake. And these external programs can do whatever they want. So, caring about sandboxing within a build system executable is just creating a security theater.
As I understand it, Zig is trying to bring in almost all the stuff that would usually be done by external tools. Zig has its own solution for finding system libraries (instead of pkg-config), it integrates its own C/C++ compiler, and you can do code generation with comptime (or, worst-case, a Zig program that can also be compiled to WebAssembly) instead of an external script. So I think there's a good chance that you'll be able to build most Zig projects entirely inside the sandbox someday.
There's still the obvious problem that if the build system emits malicious code, you'll probably run that code anyway. Personally I think this kind of sandboxing is more useful for enforcing build reproducibility rather than, like, protecting you from viruses in the build.zig file.
I think "build systems" is a too broad category in that argument.
Language-specific build facilities, like Cargo's build.rs and Zig's build scripts, typically have a limited scope - generating a bit of source code, discovering some linker flags, stuff like that. These scripts need to be run by LSP servers when opening the project in an editor to get basic features working, so that's a fairly risky thing.
They are also currently doing things like invoking CMake and other build systems, but you could definitely conceive of a world where that was a separate step in the build process, and that world seems pretty attractive to me.
A common pattern in Rust projects is to have a `*-sys` crate representing the C FFI bindings, and they typically also do something like invoke CMake or similar to actually build the C/C++ library underneath. But if you have a larger project that already integrates multiple build systems, this is really quite inconvenient in most cases.
Your proposal still contains a security hole, since it still allows executing cmake or something similar. Adding sandboxing in some parts/steps of a build system has no benefits, as soon as the system as whole has loopholes allowing bypassing such sandboxing. It's like adding more locks to the front door, when the backdoor has no locks at all.
Security is not, and in fact can never be, all-or-nothing. An imperfect solution is better than no solution. Developers have the reasonable expectation that opening a project in VS Code does not upload their home directory to a remote server. Performing a full build of a project is a different operation with different associated expectations.