[ascotan]

The article is misleading. The sale of geolocation data can still take place but not for precise locations. The bill prevents the sale of data that can identify you within 1750ft. You can still be tracked just not precisely. i.e. companies will just sell fuzzy geolocation data.

[abustamam]

Yeesh. Collect enough fuzzy data and you can identify a lot about someone.

[seanhunter]

Yes. This general problem is known as "k-anonymity". It's worth everyone who works with any sort of personally-identifiable data to read the original paper because the framework they identified is still really helpful for thinking about these issues. https://dataprivacylab.org/dataprivacy/projects/kanonymity/p...

[titzer]

8 hours in fuzzy spot one, 8 hours in fuzzy spot two, fitting some gaussian distribution, and then a few points at other times, and boom, not anonymous at all.

[baq]

add Cauchy noise, problem solved, right? …right?

[6LLvveMx2koXfwn]

Indeed, I am pretty sure an algorithm exists which both complies with the law and decompiles fuzzy data to 'less fuzzy' data, i.e. identifying data, thus obviating the ban.

[somenameforme]

Yeah I don't understand how something like this makes any sense. Just average out the data points and you're going to get pretty much a straight line path of where and what somebody did. Maybe if there's like one data point per week per person, but even that's going to be pretty informative when averaged as to exactly where somebody lives, works, and so on.

[ezwoodland]

Depends on if the independent events are uncorrelated. For example, if they had to be quantized to a grid of length 1750ft and quantized sufficiently in time as well, it might be impossible to average out since the various data points provide no new information.

[seanhunter]

This is why I posted the k-anonymity paper. A dataset is k-anonymous if using the dataset is is not possible to distinguish a given person in the dataset from k other people. Then we set a value of k we feel comfortable with and from that we can back into the areas which intuitively you would think would need to vary in size based on time of day and how many people travel through each area in the dataset.

It’s a lot of work but this is what you need to do to guarantee a given (non-zero) level of privacy. It can be done if people are serious about it.

[gwerbin]

It's a classic legislation move to look like you're doing something in order to shut down public displeasure, while not actually doing anything.

[breppp]

I assume this depends if 1750ft means the location you can derive from the data (together with other data) or the precision of the individual data point

[ascotan]

its the definition of precise geolocation data in the va code: https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title59.1/chapter53/sect...

[ck2]

knowing and consequences are apparently two entirely different things

we know every single person that went to Epstein Island from their cellphone geolocation data being sold

absolutely nothing has happened to any of them

* https://www.wired.com/story/jeffrey-epstein-island-visitors-...

* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PjPHq-Ez0nc

[datahack]

So, the fact that you went to a medical center just not the specific doctors office?

This seems weak.

[roysting]

That’s effectively always the point in this fake America (and no, that’s not a recent characteristic), misleading; or more specifically false confession, preemptive narrative control, and a form of poisoning the well.

See, peasants, we passed a bill to stop location data selling and the organs of the state called the mainstream media have triangulated and validated that for you; so now you can stop talking about your location data or that you live in a surveillance state that is inherently legitimizing of this fake American government that is a contradiction to the Constitution and the revolution in every single possible way.