The issues you linked with BitLocker are obvious properties of BitLocker-with-SecureBoot-only architecture. If you configure Linux that way, you get similar issues (for example, it's pretty easy to mis-configure TPM sealed disk encryption on Linux to still allow a recovery shell, which will run with the disk unsealed).
BitLocker with a password (the equivalent of the LUKS configuration in question) does not share these issues.
Bitlocker with a password has always felt like a second class citizen to me. You have to dig into a bunch of group policies to use it. Maybe most people don't even realize it exists.
Yah, it seems blatantly hostile how much they hide it.
I can understand the default being TPM-only + online key backup, huge amounts of the population forget their login passwords (which can be involuntary, e.g. head injury) and huge amounts of them still want some backup way to access their data rather than losing it forever.
But for anyone who cares just a little more, or would prefer to lose data in those situations, it's such an abnormal and hidden path that it's clearly blocking tons of people from choosing it.
For the system drive they seem to really strongly prefer PIN, which also doesn't have the problems linked above. I was going to use PIN as my example but didn't want to explain another set of recent BitLocker conspiracy theories yet again; maybe I should have.
It is annoying that they hate password for system drive _so_ much; the reason is actually pretty obvious when you think about how their "happy path" AD-driven enterprise deployment with stupid password rotation requirements works (and FileVault is a nightmare in this scenario), but I wish they'd make it easier for individual power users.
If you’re at all serious about security and not user convenience, you deploy BitLocker with a PIN instead of TPM only. And then a whole class of vulnerabilities goes away.
Just a PIN? For most people that's a 4-digit number, which has a worst-case scenario of 10,000 attempts and a median of only a few hundred. Why not use a full 8-digit password?
> For example, when BitLocker is used with a TPM + PIN configuration, the number of PIN guesses is limited over time. A TPM 2.0 in this example could be configured to allow only 32 PIN guesses immediately, and then only one more guess every two hours. This totals a maximum of about 4,415 guesses per year. If the PIN is four digits, all 9999 possible PIN combinations could be attempted in a little over two years.
And then depending on how "serious" you are you also don't consider Linux.
But also, threat models and the best way to mitigate them aren't really a linear scale of being <unserious> to <serious>, but a complex consideration of a particular situation.
People just plain suck at opsec. Like Che Guevara might have had a longer career as a revolutionary if he'd used his one time pads only once.
Back in the late 1980s it was clear that it would be no problem at all to hook up a hard drive to a digital phone exchange and record all the calls! I had a strict policy of "don't talk about anything illegal using electronic communication" even when it was rather banal stuff like selling weed.
The carelessness of people at Facebook documenting policies that nobody in their right mind would document boggles my mind: you might as well leave it mysterious why you didn't crack down on scam ads, for instance. When I've been involved in minor conspiracies, say when we had an HR problem with another employee, I've always made the point to meet furtively in person and avoid leaving a paper trail so that I'd never need to explain an email I wrote in front of an unfriendly audience.
>But I would never trust it a second, being proprietary and known for issues
While true if you don't trust the proprietary encryption you shouldn't trust the proprietary OS either. I think bitlocker backdoor or bugs should be the least of your concerns when the OS is literally known for covertly exfiltrating data to the cloud.
If you think for one single second that businesses and governments who rely on a lost disk being secure don’t trust bitlocker, I have oceanfront property in Missouri to sell you.
Bitlocker + PIN is as secure as anything.
A vulnerability can’t leak your key if the TPM doesn’t know the entire key and relies on the user to supply the missing parts of the key in the form of a PIN.
> A vulnerability can’t leak your key if the TPM doesn’t know the entire key and relies on the user to supply the missing parts of the key in the form of a PIN.
First off: I agree with your thesis, BitLocker with PIN is Just Fine, equivalent in all practical senses to most disk encryption strategies, and an enterprise standard.
I post this to reinforce what you're saying, because there are a ton of weird theories about how this works that make people think it's weaker than it is.
BitLocker with PIN works like this:
* BitLocker seals an encrypted key IK into the TPM using a policy on the TPM which requires the SHA-256 of the PIN to be sent to the TPM to unlock the record (and has anti-hammering at the TPM level).
* Encryption using another key called the SK. Once the OS acquires the e(IK) from the TPM, it needs to derive SK to decrypt the IK. The SK is generated by applying a salt and 0x100000 rounds SHA256 to the PIN.
* The IK can then decrypt the VMK, which can decrypt the FVEK which is the actual data encryption key used on the on-disk data.
Fully offline (no TPM access) decryption is hopeless; the IK is random and not attached to the PIN at all.
Fully online decryption relies on TPM anti-hammering; if you can manage to hammer the TPM and find a PIN where h(PIN) matches, you can then use the PIN to generate both h(PIN) (unseal TPM) and reverse e(IK).
Partially offline decryption (imagining TPM content is somehow dumped, for example by bus sniff while a user uses their PIN) relies on bruteforcing the key for e(IK), which is possible but difficult (IMO Microsoft should ratchet this up or use a more expensive algorithm than SHA-256 in order to deal with modern hardware capabilities, but they have issues like FIPS to deal with that make new algorithm selection difficult).
veracrypt lost their drivers license so afaik you should avoid it since it cannot update its drivers any longer. didnt see any news about them reacquiring that license
aah cool, thank you..100% missed the update :). thanks! thats good to read honestly lol. not that i use windows much but i felt it was MS trying to undermine it. happy it got restored and there remains an alternative to butlocker.
Tangentially: Microsoft telemetry collects the serial# of your devices and reports it (with your IP and MS account) back to the mothership, and some printers embed their serial# in printed pages.
So take countermeasures if you print something out criticizing any groups that abuse political or law-enforcement powers.
Only if you store your key with Microsoft, which is not required or the default if you're using a local account which I assume most privacy sensitive people are.
Unfortunately Microsoft keeps working to destroy that option and force consumers to make a remote account. [0][1] Their consistent moves towards wanting to co-own my computer were one of the many last-straws that made me migrate everything to Linux this year.
> Local-only commands removal: We are removing known mechanisms for creating a local account in the Windows Setup experience (OOBE). While these mechanisms were often used to bypass Microsoft account setup, they also inadvertently skip critical setup screens, potentially causing users to exit OOBE with a device that is not fully configured for use. Users will need to complete OOBE with internet and a Microsoft account, to ensure device is setup correctly.
Not to mention that unless the bitlocker activation flow changed recently, it specifically asks you how to store your backup keys, with a choice given been local options (eg. usb drive, printing it off, etc.) and saving it to your microsoft account.
dell opts you in without telling you. one day you'll just reboot to an unexpected bitlocker screen and have to figure out whether you're getting ransomwared before eventually digging a key out of your microsoft account you weren't aware was there.
Agreed it's optional (I've seen and used that option), but are local accounts even a thing any more? Or are you just referring to "not MDM controlled" accounts?
Yes, most certainly. You can easily convert to a local account in Settings, and there is still a workaround to avoid using a Microsoft account during install. Or the far more stable and reliable method of using Rufus to create the installer ISO which has an option to use a local account without the hassle.
Rufus for install + Win11Debloat post-install is a nearly effortless way to get an ad-free, local only Win 11 install that persists through updates which removes pretty much all notorious Win 11 pain points (plus additional customization if desired).
I've been doing it for years and so reading Windows 11 complaints on HN always feels like they're coming from a strange parallel universe since I never have to deal with any of it.
It's still brittle, awkward and puzzlingly awful UX despite being the literal standard for the platform.
Compare it to any of the actively maintained alternatives, Filevault for MacOS (which is wonderful and never sends your key to be kept somewhere else) or LUKS on Linux.. heck, even Veracrypt is actually easier to understand and more robust.
managing a fleet of 100+ laptops with bitlocker is a breeze. its so seemless that the users don't even realize its enabled (i.e. no UX issues, at all).
on the other hand, i am not managing 100+ laptops that use veracrypt. sounds absolutely awful. i've never managed an apple fleet, so i can't speak to that, and will take your word on it.
for personal use, i do not recommend bitlocker (or windows, really), but for already-windows enterprises? absolutely
FileVault absolutely has an optional iCloud Keychain escrow. That’s how the “unlock with Apple Account” feature works. Apple doesn’t have the keys for iCloud Keychain, but it is still stored in iCloud.
We have more issues with FileVault than we do with BitLocker, the latter being a fleet 5 times larger than the former. I find both “fine” for enterprise.
Veracrypt is more difficult to set up - whether on one machine or a fleet. Bitlocker is a few buttons in the UI, configurable via Group Policy, and so much more.
"iCloud account: Click “Allow my iCloud account to unlock my disk” if you already use iCloud. Click “Set up my iCloud account to reset my password” if you don’t already use iCloud."
"FileVault Full Disk Encryption (FDE) recovery keys are, by default, sent to Apple if the user requests them. Only one payload of this type is allowed per system."
(You don't mean BitLocker, right?)