[tredre3]

> An end-of-life Xiaomi device with no privacy or security patches for the firmware, Linux kernel, drivers and HALs for years doesn't provide the bare minimum for protecting user privacy and security.

Your very rigid view of the world is so distorted to the point of being absurd. You know damn well that the vast, vast majority of spying on Android is done in userspace.

A good OS that allows you to remove permissions from apps and further isolate things does a lot for privacy.

I respect your desire to refuse supporting anything but pixels, but please don't pretend that alternate OS on old devices don't improve privacy and security.

Frankly, that kind of rigid attitude/black and white thinking might be why you find it so hard to collaborate with upstreams.

[thewebguyd]

I don't think its rigid at all. Its important to continue to be able to receive security updates. If a device can't, mostly because qualcomm/firmware no longer wants to bother 6 months after release, it's DoA.

We don't go around telling people that it's OK to still run Windows XP for the same reason. Why is/should mobile be any different?

Stop being OK with manufacturers having garbage support. It's completely unacceptable.

[grapheneos]

The main issue is that OEMs make too many device models with unnecessary variations for carriers/regions and make too many changes to AOSP. It's extremely hard for them to properly maintain all of it.

Qualcomm offers up to 8 years of updates from platform launch. Getting around 7 years of updates requires OEMs to use the latest and great platform combined with paying Qualcomm a lot of money for long term support. It may cost a million dollars or more for each year of support. OEMs also need similar support for other components but that mostly means choosing decent components.

Providing proper updates has a cost most OEMs haven't been willing to pay. Pixels and Samsung flagships have been the exceptions. Samsung doesn't properly update most devices, only flagships, and it's still worse than Pixels in important ways. Samsung has also been closest to having all the hardware-based security features we need but doesn't let us use a lot of those due to crippling devices if they're ever unlocked.

Our partnership with Motorola Mobility partly involves them improving their devices to meet all of our requirements which was already largely happening. It also requires porting GrapheneOS to their devices and fully supporting Snapdragon again including having hardware memory tagging support on it for the first time. No one is currently using hardware memory tagging in production on Snapdragon let alone for the entire kernel and userspace as we do so it's going to be a lot of work. Motorola is going to be helping with all of this. They're also going to provide us more minimal hardware support code without unnecessary changes not needed for AOSP / GrapheneOS. A bunch of GrapheneOS features need to be ported and the device support code needs to be made compatible with our changes too including but not limited to fixing memory corruption bugs.

[GoblinSlayer]

The dichotomy here isn't grapheneos or updates, it's grapheneos or android.

[grapheneos]

GrapheneOS uses all of the standard Android security features including hardware-based security features. It also adds major security improvements including features heavily based on hardware security features which are either entirely unused or barely used by AOSP or the Pixel OS. Heavily using hardware memory tagging, integrating our USB protection with the USB controller and other features are core parts of what makes it GrapheneOS. An incomplete port without all the standard security features or the GrapheneOS added security features isn't GrapheneOS.

GrapheneOS closely follows along with Android releases, Linux kernel LTS revisions and driver/firmware updates. It had an experimental release based an Android 17 after only 2 days of it being released earlier this month. It quickly made it through our testing process with many regressions resolved to our Stable channel. This is part of what makes it GrapheneOS and an incomplete port to another device without the same updates wouldn't be GrapheneOS.

GrapheneOS is open source. People can make an incomplete port of GrapheneOS to other devices using their own project name. It's not a port of GrapheneOS to another device without having all the features and updates.

We phase in new hardware requirements for standard security features and the older generation devices without those are eventually gone. Adding a new device without hardware memory tagging would be far different than still supporting 6th/7th gen Pixels without it since we strongly recommend against buying those devices anymore and they're going to end up end-of-life.

[galangalalgol]

But on a Linux kernel that old userspace is kernelspace. There have been so many privilege escalation exploits in the kernel since then there is no difference. Every app you install effectively runs as kernel or root if it wants to.

[grapheneos]

> Your very rigid view of the world is so distorted to the point of being absurd. You know damn well that the vast, vast majority of spying on Android is done in userspace.

Most local privilege escalation (LPE) attacks used to escape the app sandbox, browser renderer sandbox or other sandboxes are done with kernel exploits. There are plenty of LPE vulnerabilities in AOSP userspace code but plenty in the userspace driver and HAL code too. It's definitely the kernel ones which are used most in practice. There are an endless stream of serious Linux kernel vulnerabilities and regularly patching the kernel is crucial to privacy/security.

Nearly all data extraction attacks are currently done with Linux kernel USB exploits and will likely need to switch to Linux kernel radio and other driver exploits when the USB attack vector is unavailable. If you care about privacy then you probably care about protecting your data from someone who obtains your device. That heavily depends on both hardware-based security features and security updates for the firmware, kernel, drivers and HALs in addition to the AOSP portion of userspace.

Disk encryption doesn't truly work on most Android devices for the majority of users because they're missing Weaver throttling support in hardware so a random 6 digit PIN can be easily brute forced once an attacker gets control over the OS. Most users don't use a strong passphrase so Weaver is critical for them. A software rate limiting implementation doesn't hold up to serious attacks.

> A good OS that allows you to remove permissions from apps and further isolate things does a lot for privacy.

Privacy depends on patching privacy vulnerabilities and shipping the standard current generation privacy protections. Android 17 without our improvements has a decent permission model and app sandbox. That's not the case if there are a bunch of privacy holes in the kernel, missing privacy features due to an outdated kernel and privacy holes in the drivers/firmware too such as tracking via Wi-Fi identifiers other than the randomized MAC.

Privacy also heavily depends on security. That's why GrapheneOS puts so much work into security rather than only privacy features. Having a nice privacy model doesn't do any good if adversaries can exploit the OS remotely, from a malicious/compromised app or another way. It doesn't provide any protection for users against many widespread attacks. Play Store regularly catches and bans a lot of apps which use LPE vulnerabilities to take over people's devices. Far more happens via distribution methods without app store review or scanning systems.

We heavily improve privacy with features like Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, Sensors toggle, Network toggle and other changes. These improvements aren't anywhere close to the highest priority on a device missing crucial privacy and security patches. It's better for someone to have a stock Android device with decent updates than a partial port of GrapheneOS with many of the privacy and security features miss

> I respect your desire to refuse supporting anything but pixels, but please don't pretend that alternate OS on old devices don't improve privacy and security.

Using those devices with LineageOS has nowhere close to reasonable privacy or security. You're missing years of Linux kernel patches, not only patches for the drivers, firmware and HALs. Not patching Linux for years is definitely important and it's not hard to exploit it if it's not getting basic updates, especially without having a lot of kernel hardening. Linux kernel exploit protections are far weaker than Android userspace exploit protections. It's the softer target and has far more privileges so that's what gets targeted. It has massive attack surface for apps despite the massive attack surface reduction done by Android. Android's standard exploit protections including attack surface reduction for the kernel are drastically better in the latest stable releases. It's not only the privacy/security patches which are important but also the standard privacy and security improvements.

The purpose of GrapheneOS is not making a highly insecure device somewhat less insecure while also making it less secure in other ways by losing verified boot and other security features.

GrapheneOS certainly doesn't refuse to support anything other than Pixels. We have an official OEM partnership with Motorola Mobility. We're working with Motorola on multiple devices meeting our requirements and providing official GrapheneOS support which should be available in under a year. You're claiming we aren't doing one of the major things we're actively working on and have announced with Motorola. We're also open to working with other OEMs once we have more resources available. It's not an exclusive partnership, but we're very busy and don't want to spread ourselves too thin.

So far, no other OEM has been both willing and able to make devices meeting our requirements so far. Samsung could do it but currently doesn't allow another OS to make use of many important security features right now since. Samsung permanently cripple devices if they're unlocked and locking it again with the stock OS doesn't restore all the functionality including security features, but even more security features are missing for an alternate OS than what's permanently disabled. They also make it extremely difficult to properly support their devices. They're welcome to change all of this and we could support their devices in the future.

[kalx]

Thanks for this. I wish it was an easy way to market this info to the wider non technical audience. It is a huge selling point for GOS that is difficult to package and make attractive (because it is difficult to understand / care about).

[HybridStatAnim8]

An objective and accurate assessment of the available options is not absurd, its the bare minimum.

As the userspace improves, more attacks will be (and are) directed at the kernel, the linux kernel is already really bad for security, and it is absolutely vital to keep updating due to its architectural deficiencies and constant issues.

Alternative OSs on subpar hardware do not improve privacy or security. They do the opposite. Other hardware does not provide vital hardware security features, and many OEMs do not provide yellowboot or any proper way to relock the bootloader with another OS. Verified boot is very important for security.

Note that the OEM provides firmware images, an end of life device can never be secure because it lacks critical firmware updates.

This isnt subjective, this isnt rigid, and this isnt a matter of attitude. This is fact.