[niemandhier]

I see that one point of criticism of the EUId is that people think it will lead to bad things because people will need iOS or android.

Ok, we are an international collective of wealthy nerds obsessed with privacy:

How much money do we need to collect to get /e/OS to be suitable?

A few million? I’d pledge 500€.

[palata]

If you're obsessed with privacy, I suggest you look at GrapheneOS instead of /e/OS, though.

[frm88]

The post you are replying to refers EUId, which implies European software, so Graphene is not an option.

[microtonal]

Why not? GrapheneOS is open source and developed by an international team of developers, why would it not fit for Europe? Besides that, /e/OS is basically LineageOS with weakened security and Murena's own cloud crap added.

It's going to be a hell lot better than /e/OS, whose CEO claims security hardening is only for criminals (pedophiles) and spies. He is peddling the same narratives in the media as those who push chat control, etc.

And the on-the-ground reality that /e/OS runs Google DroidGuard binary blobs privileged (not so degoogled, eh?), installs F-Droid packages through a proxy that the don't want to reveil the owner or purpose of (which is a disaster combines with Android's trust-on-first-use), along with being ages behind on kernel, driver, firmware, and AOSP security updates.

People who care about privacy or security should not use nor push /e/OS.

[palata]

> /e/OS, whose CEO claims security hardening is only for criminals (pedophiles) and spies

That's true, there is a video interview where he says that they are not so knowledgeable about security, and anyway they don't develop an OS for pedophiles, so it doesn't matter.

[palata]

Since I'm being downvoted, here is the source: https://x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142

About not being so knowledgeable about security, he says:

"There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface."

I won't go into details on the security side, but all the /e/OS systems I have seen don't properly relock the bootloader, meaning that they spoil the Android security model. This doesn't count as "everything we do reduces attack surface" in my book.

About his saying that security hardening is for pedophiles:

"However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice."

[frm88]

I'm in.