[jkrejcha]

If you exclude all of the flaws of one implementation and include all of the flaws of another, then of course you can say one is better than the other. But that's not a fair comparison of implementations

CSRF has incredibly simple mitigations with cookies (SameSite=strict) and can even work across different path segments (although this tends to be uncommon) and has mitigations against XSS which local storage does not. XSS is bad in either case (CSPs aren't usually an effective mitigation for a variety of reasons[1]) but being able to outright steal the session token is worse than being able to use it in a potentially more limited context

[1]: Primarily that they're generally just not implemented and that a lot of web frameworks require incredibly loose CSPs up to and including unsafe-eval since they often need to dynamically load JS. In addition, this doesn't protect from supply chain attacks (JS that is injected as the result of it being loaded from another domain, like from a CDN for example).

[szmarczak]

> XSS which local storage does not [mitigate]

True. However it's not impossible to mitigate that: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48563286

But arguably it's harder to do so.

> this doesn't protect from supply chain attacks

It's a separate attack vector. It's easily mitigated by having a one week back-off before upgrading. (and as I have said already, also affects binary executables)

> unsafe-eval

Technically speaking, nothing prevents you from shipping a JS-in-JS runtime that proxies objects and bypasses eval, which is just eval without eval.

[jkrejcha]

> True. However it's not impossible to mitigate that: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48563286

It's not a perfect mitigation for session stealing, isn't available in all cases, requires custom code to implement, and also can in some cases completely break sessions (unless they have another place where it's stored)

> It's a separate attack vector. It's easily mitigated by having a one week back-off before upgrading. (and as I have said already, also affects binary executables)

A separate attack vector for the same problem. Which is also not mitigated by dependency back-off. If you load a 3rd party script into your site, you're relying on that 3rd party not getting compromised.

For example, if I have a page

<script src="https://example.com/accel.js" />

and if "accel.js" gets maliciously replaced, it can read all of the data out of local storage. No updates on your end required.

[szmarczak]

> isn't available in all cases

Which ones? Websites that ship no JavaScript? All browsers support this.

> can in some cases completely break sessions

Or you can just remove local storage from window and have it just for yourself, which seems what Discord is doing as well.

Attackers cannot use local storage because there is no local storage on the window object.

> A separate attack vector for the same problem

It's not exactly the same problem. The example you mentioned is a footgun because you don't vendor your dependencies. Deliberately giving someone else access to your website is an issue in itself.