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If we stipulate that, we're still left wondering what the utility is of a standard that creates affordances for the insecure defaults, as opposed to just designing it right from the beginning.

jeswin 3 days ago

> utility is of a standard that creates affordances for the insecure defaults

You could make the same argument about Cookies.

> as opposed to just designing it right from the beginning

And generally, it's quite difficult to design it right from the beginning because one would often start with the wrong assumptions. Most standards evolve, and it should be acceptable.

No, that doesn't square up. It's like arguing "you could say the same thing about TCP, because it allows you to build JWTs, which are a bad protocol".

jeswin 3 days ago

Not the same. HttpOnly/Secure cookies were added much later and was not the default. They should have been inaccessible to JS by default from the beginning, and this policy has been a source of countless attacks.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mKAWpFdVcPY

unscaled 3 days ago

If memory serves me right, cookies were designed by Netscape in 1994 before JavaScript was even a thing. They were released in an early beta of Netscape (0.9 something), while Javascript was only added in Netscape 2.0. SSL 2.0 was only added in Netscape 1.0. So the HttpOnly/Secure attributes were not relevant to the first cookie design, which wasn't even a standard.

When the first cookie standard (RFC 2109) was released, the Secure attribute was added. You could argue they missed HttpOnly, but JavaScript itself was highly non-standard and underspecified mess during this period (and for a while later too). Almost nobody was thinking about XSS as far as I can tell, and that term was probably only coined at least 2 or 3 years later (by Microsoft researchers[1]). At 1997, the people who even considered XSS, probably only saw this as an HTML injection issue that can be fixed at the injection site and doesn't require any special protections against JavaScript code.

If you really want to point a finger at issues in the early cookie design, then you could talk about domain matches. Not making the port part of the matched domain and not allowing an explicit way to trigger an exact domain match with a specified domain was a mistake. And the confusing leading dot rules (probably for optimizing a substring match without parsing the domain components) was also a mistake.

But RFC 2109 was replaced with RFC 6265 and now RFC 6265bis (which is not released yet, but is mostly implemented by the big browsers). These RFCs fix most of the big issues we had with cookies, and do not shy away from breaking existing behavior: setting SameSite=Lax as the default and restricting SameSite=None to secure contexts broke A LOT of sites for improve security. The changes made in RFC 6265 to forbid multiple cookies in one header also broke many sites.

An equivalent approach in the JWT spec would be a new RFC that does the following:

1. Forbids implementing Unsecured tokens and removes alg="none".

2. Removes RSA and ECDSA (or at least deprecate them) and make Ed25519 the "Recommended+" signature algorithm. If we allow RSA and ECDSA for compatibility, they must be explicitly enabled with feature flags or some other marker that signals their insecurity and security advisories on their potential vulnerabilities must be attached.

3. Removes the entirity of JWE as it is currently implemented (to be replaced with encryption else that is NOT orthogonal to authentication).

3. Requires that HMAC secrets are specified as binary base64url data. They SHOULD be generated by a CSPRNG or a derived using a safe derivation method (such as HKDF-SHA256 with safe key material) and MUST be at least as long as the "security size" for the algorithm (i.e. 32 bytes for HS256, 48 bytes for HS384 and 64 bytes for HS512).

4. Makes the "exp" claim mandatory to set, and mandatory to verify.

5. Add a section with strict implementation guidelines for libraries, e.g. `parse()` functions that skip verifying the token should have a clear name like `inspect_without_verification()` or `dangerously_parse_without_verifying()` and `verify()` function should always receive a key that is strictly typed to a specific algorithm.

6. Remove or restrict the usage of fields that allow the JWT sender to dictate the keys used for verifying it, like "jku" or "x5c". For instance, the standard can mandate that when implementing these fields, the verifier MUST NOT accept any JWKS URLs that do not match one of the explicitly allowed patterns or X.509 certificates that are not signed by an explicitly trusted CA.

Spec writers and library authors are human? Who knew

unscaled 3 days ago

PASETO and TLS 1.3 were also written by humans. TLS libraries (which are several orders of magnitude more complicated than JWT libraries) are also written by humans.

If you passionately care about security and misuse-resistance you CAN write a spec that will lead to fewer implementation issues.

ForHackernews 2 days ago

You must be young if you're pointing to TLS libraries as an example of doing it right and not getting into trouble with insecure implementations and downgrade attacks. https://wiki.freebsd.org/LibreSSL

unscaled 2 days ago

I wish I was young. Did I explicitly said TLS __1.3__ or did I not?

A lot of effort was put into making TLS 1.3 a stronger, less agile and more misuse-resistant standard than its previous iterations. And that effort worked.

I don't understand what this is meant to communicate. The standard is either good or it isn't. "Good effort" is not an engineering assessment.

Your objection is that they should be "designing it right from the beginning" but that applies to all realms of endeavour. The reason they didn't is human frailty.

If everyone simply designed everything right from the beginning we would live in nirvana.

andai 3 days ago

I read an article about business which had this classification, "Would be weird if it worked", "Might work", and "Would be weird if it didn't work" and argued that you want to be in the last category.

In engineering we aspire to a slightly stronger standard: "I made it physically impossible to fuck this up."

And yet https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyatt_Regency_walkway_collapse...

You've completely missed my point. I don't even accept the premise of the JWT standard. But the eventual migration to safer default settings, in a format that continues to expend implementation effort to support settings nobody should use, is in fact a practical engineering problem with the standard.

[0] https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8725/

And they've published updates[0] and libraries have hardened their defaults and removed support for insecure values (e.g. alg='none'). I'm not sure what more you want?

I'd rather use a refined, battle-tested standard with lots of eyes on it than some new untested contender produced by a handful of upstarts ("look, we just designed it right from the beginning! This time it's perfect!") PASETO reeks of second-system syndrome.

Not for long

JWT libraries had poor defaults because the spec was poorly designed.

Of course JWT can be implemented securely. Even XMLDSig can be implemented securely. But if the spec is not designed with security and misuse-resistance as a tier 1 priority, you will get more issues. The fact that we didn't see the same sheer volume of issues with PASETO or macaroon libraries (admittedly, the later are far less numerous). I can find only one CVE for a PASETO library from 2020, and this is an issue that has nothing to do with the algorithm itself (JPaseto < 0.3.0 switched the order of two arguments in their hash function call, generating weaker hashes).

The reason PASETO won't have the same issues as JWT is the design (especially with v3/v4). There is no alg=none, symmetric keys are fixed size (so no weak keys can be used) and algorithm confusion is prevented by an explicit implementation guide[1] that strongly mandates that keys for different algorithm version have different types, and verification functions MUST reject a key of the wrong type.

Is JWT safe now? Maybe. A lot of issues have been fixed, but new issues keep coming all the time. We're not even halfway into this year and I can count at least the following serious 2026 CVEs: CVE-2026-28802, CVE-2026-29000, CVE-2026-1529, CVE-2026-22817/8, CVE-2026-34950, CVE-2026-23993, CVE-2026-32597, just to name a few. Most of them are the same classic alg=none, signature verification bypass and algorithm confusion issues.

The issues is that new libraries are coming all the time and the vulnerability elimination process for existing libraries is just a random scattershot. If a security researcher has happened across a vulnerability in library X and reported it, it's solved. If nobody has found it yet: though luck. Unless you pick a library that has been officially audited for these issues, you don't really know if it's truly safe. If you use a PASETO library, it's probably not audited either, but the chance of it having these common types of issues (and other issues, like psychic signatures[2]) are close to nil.

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[1] https://github.com/paseto-standard/paseto-spec/blob/master/d...

[2] https://www.securecodewarrior.com/article/psychic-signatures