[inglor_cz]

So, the US relearns all the lessons of the Russo-Ukrainian war the hard way? Choppers proved very vulnerable already in 2022.

History often repeats itself. In a similar way, Great Powers like France refused to study the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 because it was something that happened in barbarian lands far away from glorious Europe, so it was obviously irrelevant to them, right? And then the shock of industrial warfare almost shattered the French army in summer 1914.

[tristanj]

Absolutely incorrect. The attitude within the military industrial complex towards drone/UAVs has shifted enormously since the Russia/Ukraine conflict. However, procurement times on new equipment is on the order of several years to nearly a decade. There's not enough time to produce nor acquire this hardware.

The US military is sitting on decades of older equipment. The Ukraine conflict started four years ago. Complaining that the US has not overhauled its inventory in just four years is unreasonable and unrealistic.

[Planktonne]

> However, procurement times on new equipment is on the order of several years to nearly a decade. There's not enough time to produce nor acquire this hardware.

This has not seemed to be a problem for the countries using them; what makes the US so uniquely inefficient?

[SirFatty]

Unlike Iran and Ukraine, the US military weapons are not manufactured in someone's garage or basement.

[Planktonne]

But Iran and Ukraine are being very effective with their basement drones. If the US's manufacturing is fancier but not faster, meaning that it takes longer to get weaponry, that's not a good thing. It sounds like waste more than industry.

[inglor_cz]

US-produced Hornets (ex-Google boss Eric Schmidt is the CEO) are very modern and are now destroying Russian logistics to Crimea. From what I have heard, they are iterating fast based on what the Ukrainian operators report back.

This shows that the US private sector can well produce contemporary drones on a compressed time scale.

It is the Pentagon which is not interested in overhauling settled vendor relations.

[rbanffy]

That should only make the US able to churn a lot more drones than a couple people working out of a basement. Assembly lines can work wonders.

[everforward]

Assembly lines are much faster but less flexible, which is probably a bad fit for something evolving as quickly as drone weapons.

A basement lab can start making new drones as soon as you can get them the components. An assembly line will take months to get any new machinery it needs, set it up, ensure production works, figure out how to QA it at scale, etc.

It doesn’t matter if you can make 8 million drones if the enemy already has a way to counter that particular kind of drone. Eg I think Ukraine has been through a bunch of iterations as they adapt to Russian tank armor, jammers, extended range, etc.

[rbanffy]

You need to make the hardware modular and the lines easy to change.

[genxy]

Are you sure it is because they aren't manufactured in a garage are they they are manufactured by MIC. The MIC is working as intended, it turns tax payer debt in MIC dollars. That by definition, can't happen in a garage.

[inglor_cz]

Quite a lot of Ukrainian-designed drones are nowadays produced in Western Europe in normal factories and sent to Ukraine. That is one of the reasons why Russia cannot simply destroy Ukrainian factories.

Ukraine deploys several million drones a year, you can't get there by mere artisan workshops in garages.

Sure, the designer teams back in Ukraine are lean, their members wear tracksuits and don't have a 50-head Human Resources to watch their behavior, nor three levels of managers wearing Philippe Patek above them. That is part of the efficiency and lower cost.

[sam_lowry_]

Well then they have to hurry up or loose the war ;-)

[inglor_cz]

"However, procurement times on new equipment is on the order of several years to nearly a decade."

Interesting that the Ukrainians can design, develop, produce and deploy a new type of a drone in something like 6 weeks.

Of course, they are in a life-or-death struggle and thus cannot afford a decade of paper wars with various lawyerly and MBA types who want to have their say.

That said, the US cannot afford those either, but it is under the illusion that it still can. Structural ossification at its best, and the result is ... inability to beat an impoverished, long sanctioned Middle-Eastern authoritarian regime into submission.

[tristanj]

Ukraine has been operating under general mobilization and martial law since 2022. Comparing Ukraine to the United States which is under no mobilization and civilian rule is not a fair comparison. If the United States was fully mobilized and restructured into a war economy like Ukraine, we would see rapid changes in military doctrine.

On Iran, describing the US as "inable" to win is structurally incorrect. The US could always win the war whenever it wants to. Same with Russia vs Ukraine. Both the USA and Russia have ICBMs. Neither choose to use them, for political reasons.

[ponector]

>>The US could always win the war whenever it wants to. Same with Russia vs Ukraine.

Yes, russia can win anytime. They simply decided to grind a million of russians instead.

ICBM is a deterrent, not a winning weapon.

[inglor_cz]

The gap between weeks and years is big, though. Even in peacetime conditions, this process could be sped up if necessary. Indeed it might not make any sense at all to think in years and decades when it comes to such a quick-evolving industry. Whatever drone the DoD sets in stone now, will likely be obsolete by 2030.

The Ukrainian drone industry isn't particularly expensive, BTW, and mostly grew up from private sector grassroots. Ukrainian military has had its own share of problems with ossified Soviet-era leadership. They were able to route around these, though. The US does not want to do this so far; probably too much money involved, and not enough risk to rock those boats (or yachts).

On Iran, describing the US as "inable" to win is structurally incorrect. The US could always win the war whenever it wants to.

Are you sure, with the shortages of equipment that take years to replenish? In what sense? I am not even sure if the US has enough naval capability to make a D-day-like landing in Iran right now. That requires specialized ships and training.

The US could probably win the war if it went in fully: as you say, if it was fully mobilized and restructured into a war economy like Ukraine. But that is already quite a bad situation to be in. If a superpower needs to do this in order to fight someone like Iran, it is not really a (conventional) superpower anymore.

The US could also wipe Iran using nuclear missiles, but the political ramifications of such a step would be catastrophic.

So could Pakistan. Pakistan has enough nukes to wipe Iran off the Earth (not that they want to). But no one mistakes Pakistan for a superpower just because they have deliverable nukes.

[tristanj]

My impression from reading your comment is that you do not understand US doctrine. The US focuses on blitzkrieg, air supremacy, and precision strikes. Its doctrine is totally opposite of what is happening in the Ukraine/Russia conflict, which is a protracted WWI-era trench warfare conflict with minimal airpower by either side. The US is not optimized to fight such a war.

Neither do you understand that the US has optimized its military around conflict against the PRoC. The US has fought multiple proxy wars against the PRoC. Arguably, the current Iran conflict is a proxy war against the PRoC. Future military spending is focused on countering China, not on the style of conflict Ukraine is facing.

That is why the US is phasing out military assets such as infantry forces and artillery, and is investing in unmanned vehicles and long-range missiles.

Further, you incorrectly quote and misinterpret what I wrote about ICBMs. The US (and Russia) could always win their current conflicts with ICBMs, but choose not to. That is a calculated choice, not an inability to win as you claim.

[inglor_cz]

I understand the US doctrine, which is also fine-tailored to buying very expensive systems from certain corporations that have few to none competitors and feel no real pressure to innovate.

"Arguably, the current Iran conflict is a proxy war against the PRoC."

That is stretching it. The vast majority of weapons that Iran deployed were of their own build, and China sends nowhere near as much equipment to Iran as, say, Europe to Ukraine.

"Future military spending is focused on countering China, not on the style of conflict Ukraine is facing."

Which is part of the problem. As a wanna-still-be-superpower, the US will face a lot of diverse conflicts in the world, with various characteristics.

"The US is not optimized to fight such a war."

The US is not optimized to a bombing campaign against countries the size of Iran anymore either. You are literally running out of things to throw at them after mere weeks have passed.

Good luck fighting China then, with its 16x as big population and 100x as big economy than Iran has.

"The US (and Russia) could always win their current conflicts with ICBMs, but choose not to. That is a calculated choice, not an inability to win as you claim."

War is continuation of politics, not just destruction for its own sake. To win the war does not mean "utterly destroy a certain region", but "make the opponent do as you wish, at least in some aspects, against his will, while not suffering catastrophic consequences elsewhere".

If political constraints stop you from deploying WMDs, and you cannot achieve your political aims with conventional weapons, that counts as an inability to win the war. Can the US make the Iranian leadership drop their nuclear ambitions? It does not seems so. Can the US wipe Iran off the map? Yes, but at the cost of becoming a pariah nation, which is worse than ayatollahs having a few nukes. Only a fool would call the latter "victory".

[watwut]

> The US has fought multiple proxy wars against the PRoC

That is beyond absurd claim. But, if it was true, then the USA is loosing even more badly. This war is helping exactly two countries - Russia and China.

> The US (and Russia) could always win their current conflicts with ICBMs, but choose not to.

This is copium and in both cases. If Russia could win that conflict, if it could take over, it would do it. If USA could win, they would do it. Heck, if USA was able to walk away from the conflict, at this point it would. It just so happen that Israel does not want to allow it and Iran thinks they are getting into better position with each passing week.

[Steltek]

You present two issues: 1) the US is slow to adapt to drone warfare and 2) the US is losing to Iran.

For 1), the US isn't in a hurry because there's no actual threat. The lack of drone warfare capabilities only impacts US action overseas and of the little bipartisan consensus left, one thing is clear: no new wars (Trump's Iran war is seen as betrayal from his own party but it's hard to oppose Dear Leader).

For 2), it's hard to win when you don't know what you're doing or declare victory when you don't know what your goals are. I'm not sure there's even domestic agreement that it's a war.

[inglor_cz]

1) actual threats tend to mature in weeks, so this is a good recipe to get caught with pants down.

2) I concur, there seem to be no actual goals there. There is a Croatian saying that "form whomever who doesn't know where he wants to sail, no wind is useful". This fits.

[Steltek]

1) Threats from who? Canada? Mexico? For the past ~150 years, the US has really only had overseas conflicts with few threats to domestic territory. The best argument you could make it the Cuba Missile Crisis, I suppose? If your immediate plan is to stop fighting in far away places, then drones aren't really a worry.

[inglor_cz]

Threats to your allies, for example.

"If your immediate plan is to stop fighting in far away places, then drones aren't really a worry."

Yes, you can dismantle the entire coalition your presidents put together for 70+ years, but at some cost. The US economy is heavily intertwined with the rest of the world, and it probably cannot decouple from China AND forty democratic countries that used to be US allies at the same time.

Might be cheaper just to respect the current entanglements, at least in the long run.

[adjejmxbdjdn]

Trump class warships and plans for more aircraft carriers suggest otherwise.

[Kampfschnitzel]

I am far from a US supporter, but just because a single Apache was downed, doesn't mean the US isnt adapting to the new kind of warfare we've seen from Ukraine. Also Iran =/= Ukraine.

Furthermore, Choppers arent obsolete and if you got em, it makes sense go use them.

Currently it's hard for any nation to meaningfully adapt, as the new tech develops far faster than any governement procurment process.

[inglor_cz]

I haven't claimed that choppers are obsolete. I have said that they are vulnerable, and they indeed are.

Both UA and RU still operate helicopters, but their survival envelope has tightened drastically and they won't even try to fly a chopper over a wide body of water anywhere near the enemy. To survive in a drone-infested war theatre, a chopper must fly really low and mask itself using terrain features as much as possible.

[enoint]

The French 75 was the best mobile gun in Europe. They entered the war expecting to be mobile and were the first to use poison gas. Compared to the Imperial Russian Navy? I don’t see it. The most dramatic lesson was that Japan prefers surprise attacks.

[inglor_cz]

The most important lessons of the Russo-Ukrainian war weren't the naval ones. The siege of Port Arthur was an almost perfect pre-image of future trench warfare in WWI.