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I have the third edition, so I can only speak for it. Being the 3rd edition of the book, I assume that it is the 3rd time the text is revised, so I expect the other two editions (1st and 2nd) to adolesce from the same problem, which I state in the following paragraphs. The mention to Dreyfus in the 3rd edition of Artificial Intelligence, a Modern Approach, by Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, is made in 4 different places of the book, referencing four different problems. The first mention is in page 279, effectively in the bibliographical notes, and it is about something called the 'frame problem'. Dreyfus presents this problem in the 1972 edition of the book, as a problem pertaining 'how to differentiate figure from ground', or 'how to account for what is important and what is not in a specific scenario'. But the solution to the problem that Norvig and Russel cite (Ray Reiter, 1991) is from a paper that _changes the conditions of the problem_, even _change the problem completely_ (by reductionism) to 'how to detect objects that do not change after an action'. They claim the problem solved, but they are actually not addressing Dreyfus criticisms, and misleading the reader to think that the problem is actually solved. The frame problem, by now, is still unsolved (and is one of the most difficult problems to solve). The second mention is in page 1024, under a section called 'Weak AI: Can machines act intelligently?', and subsection 'The argument from informality'. The section mentions the books What Computers can't do (1972) and What Computers still can't do (1992), as well as Mind over Machine (1986). Unfortunately, this section completely misunderstands the critique of AI that Dreyfus exposes in those books. The whole section is misleading, obfuscating or tergiversing the critique from Dreyfus to fit the purpose of Norvig and Russell (mainly, to show that advances in machine learning and AI can make a solid base for machines that 'act intelligently'). The third mention is in page 1049, and it tries to undermine the first-step fallacy (which is similar to the fallacy of composition). Again, they do it by completely dismissing Dreyfus' critique, not addressing the issue. Then they go on talking about 'rationality' (as explained in chapter 1), but with a trick: only in terms of machines, goal-oriented expectations, computing resources. Dreyfus' critique is about the overall AI enterprise and the search for 'artificial' intelligence, Russell and Norvig discourse in this section first reduce Dreyfus' critique to what they can handle, to their own terms. That is, they evade the issue. The fourth and final mention, in page 1072, is the bibliographical citation. Re-reading the non-technical, but more theoretical parts of the book just made me realize how poorly constructed the book is. For example, the definitions given about AI in page 2 are just laughable. Compare with an introductory text on Psychology [0]. [0] https://pressbooks.openeducationalberta.ca/saitintropsycholo... |