[slibhb]

> I actually don't think neuroscience can solve it either. Science could decide whether, e.g. equivalent physical processes are occurring in dogs and humans, and you could argue that solves the question for things with physical brains, but even then it can't measure whether another brain has the same subjective experience as you do. It can't really do that for other humans

Imagine a device that you put on your head and press "record". After 5 minutes, you press "stop" and then I put it on my head and press "play". I then experience those 5 minutes as you experienced them. You could also replay your own 5 minutes and confirm the recording is accurate.

That device doesn't exist today -- it's sci-fi -- but there's no known law of physics that forbids it. If it is built it would be a lot of progress towards, perhaps even a solution for, the hard problem.

The only realistic way we either build that device or prove that it can't be built is science (probably neuroscience). So, my opinion is that, to a large degree, when we opine about "subjective nature of experience" we're bloviating a bit. Our experience is subjective now but there's no law of physics that says that must always be true.

[andrewflnr]

It wouldn't solve the hard problem. I still couldn't verify that the recording gives you the exact subjective experience it gives me. Yes, I'm leaning into the unfalsifiability but that's kind of the point of why it's Hard. We have this nugget of unfalsifiability at the core of our experience.

Anyway, if someone claimed to create such a machine I would, in fact, very much doubt that it actually creates the same experience simply because no human brain is quite physically the same, so it will interact differently with the machine. That's true even if experience is entirely physical.

> The only realistic way we either build that device or prove that it can't be built is science.

There's another possibility: the device remains in the realm of hazy infeasibility forever, where no one succeeds convincingly but we also never articulate why it's impossible. I think this is more likely. Certainly the engineering would be extremely difficult.

Any candidate device will face the usual objections about the relationship between experience and its physical correlates, plus the one I mentioned above about physical differences between brains, and probably a dozen more depending on the details. You'll be able to choose to believe it proves consciousness is physical, or not, but you can already choose that today with equally strong evidence. It's like a binary Rorschach test for your assumptions about metaphysics.

[slibhb]

> It wouldn't solve the hard problem. I still couldn't verify that the recording gives you the exact subjective experience it gives me. Yes, I'm leaning into the unfalsifiability but that's kind of the point of why it's Hard. We have this nugget of unfalsifiability at the core of our experience.

If we understood conscious experience well enough to capture and replay it so closely that the person who had the experience could verify it, then almost no one would care about the hard problem.

Sure, there'd be a speck of doubt. But if the removal of all doubt is required to solve a problem then no problem is soluble.

> There's another possibility: the device remains in the realm of hazy infeasibility forever, where no one succeeds convincingly but we also never articulate why it's impossible. I think this is more likely. Certainly the engineering would be extremely difficult.

That's where we are now. And we should just admit it, instead of claiming that "consciousness is inherently subjective" or whatever.

> Any candidate device will face the usual objections about the relationship between experience and its physical correlates, plus the one I mentioned above about physical differences between brains, and probably a dozen more depending on the details. You'll be able to choose to believe it proves consciousness is physical, or not, but you can already choose that today with equally strong evidence. It's like a binary Rorschach test for your assumptions about metaphysics.

What equally strong evidence exists today? Comparing it to a rorschach is absurd. I worry your view amounts to epistemological nihilism. The vast majority of peope would admit that we had a thorough understanding of consciousness if we could record and replay it, two things we certainly can't do today.

[andrewflnr]

The nature of the problem compels epistemological nihilism. I try to be a good empiricist, but some things are not measurable, and there is no moral authority over the universe that entitles us to access all possible truth.

> If we understood conscious experience well enough to capture and replay it so closely that the person who had the experience could verify it, then almost no one would care about the hard problem.

Practically speaking, though, perhaps this is correct.

[slibhb]

I think you're ultimately right that my hypothetical device wouldn't solve the hard problem. And that there is a link between throughgoing empiricism and epistemological nihilism.

I'd compare to physics today. We're less interested in why the laws of physics exist now that we have pretty good theories with solid predictive power. Nevertheless, the mystery remains.

I appreciate the dialogue!

[Gooblebrai]

Strange Days