> A meaningful slowdown or pause would require multiple well-resourced labs at or near the frontier, in multiple countries, agreeing to stop under the same conditions. It would also require that each can verify that the others have actually stopped. Due to the unique characteristics of AI systems, the detectability (a lower standard than verifiability) element of this arms control problem is much more challenging than with other technologies. Training runs are far easier to conceal than missile silos, their inputs are general-purpose, and the incentive to defect quietly is enormous, because whoever continues while others pause could inherit the lead. A credible pause also has to specify what triggers it, what lifts it, and who adjudicates.
And later:
> In the coming months, we will organize conversations where policymakers, researchers, civil society, and other AI companies can help answer some of the questions this piece raises, especially around full recursive self-improvement and how to create better options for coordination and deliberation. We’ll publish what comes out of it. The window to investigate the questions together is here, and people outside AI companies should be involved in this deliberation.
they explicitly mention in the article that just frontier stopping isnt enough because then that just means others will catch up, they want to be the leaders of a global organization/cartel that bans everyone except themselves. Particularly important given anthropic attacks china and opensource every chance they get. https://www.anthropic.com/news/detecting-and-preventing-dist...
Gell-Mann amnesia expressed by people when a corporation says something they like is both baffling and disheartening to see.
Altman, Amodei, and the rest of them are anthropomorphic grease. their personal wealth is tied to the value of their respective companies. everything they say and do is self-serving.