[petra]

Regarding consciousness , I like the explanation by neuroscientist Ramachandran:

https://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/ramachandran07/ramachandran...

In short, as far as I can remember: evolutionary, it makes sense to understand other humans, to feel what they feel(empathy - the mirror neurons system), and simulate their thinking and feelings.

And once we have those systems, we can also use those on ourselves. And that's consciousness.

Edit:And I wonder if this is a testable hypothesis, in a simulation.

[IsTom]

This way of thinking can only explain externally-visible parts of consciousness. It does nothing to address internal experience of being conscious and qualia. I don't think the internal experience has any bearing on physical reality (P-zombies would act the same externally) which makes this something outside of the realm of currently understood physics.

[layer8]

The internal experience has bearing on physical reality right here, because without it you wouldn’t have written about it and caused these words to appear on my screen in physical reality. It affects your thinking, and hence your actions and utterances in the physical word.

For reasons like that, I don’t think that P-zombies are possible.

[IsTom]

Internal experience affects movement of physical molecules in what way?

[orangecat]

Having internal mental experiences causes my brain to send physical signals to my fingers in order to type the words "I have internal mental experiences". A philosophical zombie would type those same words, but they would be caused by something else since by definition it lacks those experiences. That would be rather surprising, and it would be even more surprising that the words that the zombie emits coincidentally correspond exactly to the experiences that the non-zombie has.

(See https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/fdEWWr8St59bXLbQr/zombies-zo... for a much longer version of this argument)

[IsTom]

As the article says the alternatives (that the author seems to favor instead) boil down to "there's some physics we missed" and probably that's the point where we differ. I find that implausible, what would that be? Consciousness quantum field? Consciousness boson? If it's going to be interacting with matter it has to have a way to do that.

[layer8]

Internal experience is an input to your mind (that’s how you know about it), and what your mind perceives affects what it does. The better question is: how can what you experience possibly not affect your actions?

[IsTom]

What you do is determined by physical action of neurons. There is no need for there to be someone to perceive it.

[braebo]

The need arises when you consider the complex social systems humans leverage for survival — our ability to navigate interpersonal conflicts and engage in cooperation relies on theory of mind and our tendency to perceive ourselves as individual free agents empathizing with separate free agents.

[layer8]

By definition, internal experience is something you perceive, and what you perceive informs how you act. Therefore internal experience affects outward physical action.

[jeremyjh]

Qualia are the inside view of sensory data and reward signals.

Think about it from an evolutionary perspective:

Animals that step into a lava flow or forest fire don't reproduce. Eventually some evolve the ability to detect intense heat from a distance, and pain as soon as tissue destruction is imminent. They do not have nor need a general understanding of the dangers of heat, or even conscious awareness that they've stepped on a hot coal.

The pain signal compels them, but that is very low level machinery. It had to continue compelling beings that developed larger and more sophisticated brains that are capable of abstract thought and reasoning. Feeling pain is one of the lowest level parts of the brain telling the higher parts exactly what its going to do in terms that permit no disagreement.

[Joeri]

Internal to what? The brain is not a monolithic thing, it is different parts communicating and interconnecting. When the connection between the halves is cut, the person objectively becomes two people, but still experiences and presents themselves as one. Observing ourselves is just one part of the brain responding to another, or theorizing on past behavior. There is probably no actual introspection going on inside of the human brain, only the perception of one.

[IsTom]

Internal as in that which is feeling things. In this context the physical brain is what is responsible for what you do and feel, but it is not physically different from other matter and it requires no "internal observer" do do its thing.

[petra]

There are some evolutionary theories why did qualia("phenomenal awareness") evolved. I don't know much about those, so i can't write about that.

[AgentMatt]

Oh, that's a very interesting hypothesis!

Not sure about taking it down to the level of consciousness, but makes sense regarding the sense of self, the conceptual experiencer, the perceived center of experience. It agrees well with the observation I have made again and again they my sense of self is much stronger when I'm around people, and stronger still when I'm in a context where I don't know people and/or am uncertain in social rules.

This can be as immediate as dancing in a club, and closing my eyes I feel open, free, still, the body just flowing, then opening my eyes and feeling the cage of categorization of the world, relating my self to other people as a major function, coming right back.

Also being alone in nature for me makes the sense of self drop. Without intention, spending even just a few hours alone in a forest seems to quiet down the part modeling my self in relation to the world so much. There's no need for it there. I'm not a person in a forest; I become the trees, the birds, the rustling of the leaves, the sun shining through the canopy.

[petra]

I agree about the forest part. and your comment was interesting.

I know that the part of the brain responsible for the self thoughts is called the "default mode network". and meditation can reduce it's activity, i.e. the internal monologue stops, but also it can be measured via FMRI.

So i wondered: are the mirror neurons part of the "default mode network"? I asked claude that, he said no, they are two different systems.

So maybe the mirror neurons, those responsible for empathy, "to feel as someone else" are also responsible for becoming the trees, the birds and the rushing of the leaves?

[wat10000]

There's a really, really big gap there. It reminds me of South Park's underpants gnomes.

1. Simulate others' thinking and feelings.

2. ???

3. Consciousness!

Why would one lead to the other? How would one lead to the other?

[DangitBobby]

It's interesting, but the explanation seems to exclude the possibility that my dog has some sense of self, so I find it suspect.

[baggy_trough]

Don't dogs have similar social issues?

[DangitBobby]

I'm not saying that they don't have some internal self model that helps them model the internal states of others, quite the opposite. I am saying this specific explanation seems to lean on a biological mechanism that (at least by the phrasing of the linked article) is only present in "hominids".