If it's actually usable economically then the government will partially recover (capture value) it via taxation. If US suppliers fail to match the predicted effects, then Chinese or other suppliers can. This yields tax receipts in China and elsewhere. So if it's actually 'distributable' then it is worth at least some non-zero capturable amount as sales to foreign governments if the US government will not be participating, even if you suppose no private entities will buy the information.
It seems you've completely lost the plot. Refer to what we're replying to
>Can you think of any economically valuable reason why it might be important to know about weather trends or events in advance? Any at all?
You're damning me for questioning someone who presumed market efficiency with an appeal to economic value to a government that stands to capture that hypothetical value? The premise of the government acting on market efficiency was what I responded to, not my introduction.
If we're discounting the premised market efficiency of the government actor to which I replied, then the question was moot, and you're targeting the wrong commenter. But of course, that wouldn't fit your two-faced (and post response underhanded conniving editing 'centrally-') rebuttal, so you wait to set the catch-22 trap of damning rebuttal comments for acting on a premise introduced in a counter viewpoint.
The comment you originally responded to does not presume market efficiency. In fact it carries the opposite assumption - if markets were efficient then the loss of economic value from weather forecasting would be immediately apparent and we wouldn't need to discuss larger-concept models with the goal of overcoming inefficiencies.
That original comment posits an idea of "economic value" that is independent from what can be captured by whomever is contributing to it, which is what you seemed to be rejecting.
The market efficiency it presumes is that an appeal to value is actually a rational actionable appeal to the government actor. That seems to be the whole point of the question (paraphrased) "can't you see the value of the thing we're losing" and speaking that to someone who stands to capture the value via tax receipts.
Of course if the government doesn't care at all about the 'market efficiency' of that value it's not clear why this question is even posed -- a hypothetically irrational rejection of the efficient projection of this value seems to be what the question contends with. The very question relies on a premise of someone somewhere acting with market efficiency on this data. With zero market 'efficiency' from the data, there's no useful market value generated whether you frame it as "capturable" or not.
> The market efficiency it presumes is that an appeal to value is actually a rational actionable appeal to the government actor. That seems to be the whole point of the question (paraphrased) "can't you see the value of the thing we're losing" and speaking that to someone who stands to capture the value via tax receipts.
Ah, no, but at least this puts our difference in stark relief. One can rationally appeal to government (as a democratic institution with a goal of furthering lofty ideals, like society and the economy in general) without necessarily appealing to government (as a selfish entity) desire to collect more tax receipts. If you must, think of it as appealing to individuals who may or may not support the government, and the government optimizing for that support rather than optimizing for mere tax dollars (which it can always print more of).