[margalabargala]

Your point generalizes to, your emotional state is a reflection of the state of your physical medium.

Why can't that physical medium be GPUs and RAM? And temperature sensors and cameras? What's special about our meat that it's our "body" in the way a computer is not the body of an AI?

I don't think the point being argued can be true without some incredibly contrived, human centric definitions of "body".

[felipeerias]

What are you, ultimately, if not your body?

[margalabargala]

I don't know. I also don't see how that changes the question. What is an AI, ultimately, without its computer hardware?

[felipeerias]

Hardware is fungible. Each LLM response in a conversation could be served from a different machine.

Would you be "you" in a different body?

[margalabargala]

Human bodies are fungible. I think I would be "me" in a different body, yes. So is anybody.

To claim otherwise would mean anyone who's gotten a transplant or amputation is no longer themselves.

[confidantlake]

What most people think of as "me" is a product of their brain. If you somehow could get a brain transplant you certainly would not be "you".

[margalabargala]

Sure, if you remove the brain or delete the weights then the human or LLM are different than they were.

[felipeerias]

What, exactly, would be the link between you as you are right now, and “you” in a different body?

[foltik]

From a functionalist perspective, there is no “you” sitting in one body or another.

The experience of “you” is just your specific memories and world model, continuously updated with sensory input.

If another body “runs” the same exact pattern, that is you. Theres no link and nothing was transferred; the pattern of thoughts and memories is all “you” ever was.

Same as playing the same song on two different speakers. Nobody asks what links the song across them; it’s the same song wherever it’s played. You’re just a far more complicated pattern on a far more complicated speaker.

You might ask, “but why am I this pattern?” Because this is the specific pattern modeling itself from the inside in asking that question.

[margalabargala]

Well, you'll have to tell me. Your question depends on your choice of language meaning.

If "I" am in a different body, then what makes that "me" who's in a different body?

[maxerickson]

Of course they are themselves. The question is whether they are a different self.

[margalabargala]

The answer to that can be anything anyone would like it to be, depending on what definition of "self" they choose.

I don't see why hardware is any more fungible than a kidney. If your LLM reads the serial numbers of its motherboard/RAM/etc as a seed for entropy you can make identical arguments about body fungibility and self.