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by erichocean
4950 days ago
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I assume he's talking about errors in the runtime itself. For example, you could write a secure Java app (let's assume this is possible), but if the JVM has a security flaw (and it did), it doesn't really matter, because the runtime is mandatory. Over the years, I've become more and more distrustful of large, complicated systems designed "for my safety", and migrated towards tiny systems + formal verification/model checking/exhaustive symbolic testing. 100% certified and bug free (in the sense of "doesn't implement the spec") is where I think at least the safety and security critical part of the industry will be in 30 years. The tools available today are incredibly powerful, but systems designed over 5-10 years ago are unable to take advantage of them. There's no reason programs cannot be bug free with respect to their specifications today, given the tools we have at our disposal. |
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It would be great to formally verify the runtime and task infrastructure. In fact people have started to create (small, incomplete) Promela models of the message passing infrastructure. However, it's lower priority than figuring out what works from a pragmatic standpoint and implementing it at the moment.