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by My_Name
10 days ago
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I note for premise 2 that the people who doubt the premise are the very stupid, but more importantly the very smart. The former is no challenge to the premise, but the latter? That is a different story. EDIT : For S&G I asked Claude about it. It replied : The talk groups Penrose with the religious doubter, as if the two objections were the same species and could be dispatched by the same gesture: most of us find this easy to accept. But that's a headcount, not an argument. The religious objection can be set aside because it rests on a premise (the soul) the materialist simply doesn't share. Penrose's can't, because it's pitched entirely inside the materialist frame — Gödelian limits on algorithmic understanding, non-computable physics in the substrate. You don't get to wave that away; you have to show it's wrong. The talk does the former and pretends it's done the latter. The entire superintelligence thesis is a wager on the authority of intelligence — that smarter minds see further, judge better, and that this is precisely why we should fear or defer to them. If you take that seriously, then dissent from the very smartest humans on the exact question of whether minds are substrate-independent is the most expensive dissent available. You can't venerate intelligence as the thing that settles everything and then file your most intelligent objector under "outliers, moving on." The move is self-undermining on the argument's own terms. |
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