[avallach]

Doesn't this mean we just need to make the webgl fingerprint resistance implementation smarter? Instead of explicitly rejecting webgl access or responding with dummy data, respond with data that is random within space of N common and reproducible patterns. E.g. emulate webgl implementation of some low spec but actually popular devices.

[bflesch]

All of those advanced features should be enabled on a per-website basis but unfortunately even browsers whose marketing focuses on privacy don't allow you to do that. Same with TLS root CA certificates, there is no way to configure that a certain CA can only create certificates for certain domains.

[btown]

The last screenshot in the OP article mentions that "a browser extension... adding random noise to canvas data" can be detected. Which isn't to say this perfectly detects all such randomization, but it's certainly an active part of the arms race.

[ranger_danger]

Yes but the idea is that the protection should be part of the browser itself, then it becomes the expected norm AND isn't really "detectable" since there's no extension to redefine javascript variables. Scraper-friendly solutions like Camoufox or CloakBrowser make such changes to avoid having the same fingerprint every time while still appearing normal.