[vbezhenar]

I think it's a bit different.

USSR just wasn't rich enough to afford experimentation and innovation. Resources (including human brain power) were quite limited. So they had to copy proven solutions. Simple as that.

It's easy to judge them in the retrospective. But they had to make decisions, using the information the had at the moment, weighing risks as they saw them at that moment.

[ajcp]

The comment you are replying to is correct. The Soviet Union had massive amounts of resources and capital (both human and economic) to be able to develop and support technical innovations. The wider-Soviet bloc itself was of such a scale as to be able to completely support their own divergent technologies and innovations. The higher education systems themselves were sufficient to provide and foster the talent, even if they were overly-politicized.

Of issue, especially as time went on, was the overly-centralized nature of national resource and economic strategy and planning. Especially ESPECIALLY constraining was the dual-circuit monetary system of its economy, which literally prevented half of its "capital" to follow innovation or market forces outside of centralized allocation.

I highly recommend the book Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union by Vladislav Zubok

[Insimwytim]

> overly-centralized nature of national resource and economic strategy and planning.

This is a common misconception. Supported by the Soviet Union government in the 80s.

The fact is, that the efforts to sabotage and disband central planning started as early as 1954.

In 1954 an executive order of 14 Oct 1954 reduced the amount of administrative personnel by 450 thousands.

The amount of metrics went down from 9 940 to 6 308 in 1954, to 3 081 in 1955, and to 1 780 in 1958.

Khrushchev moved most of the planning power from central planning institution to the regions and down to the factories and enterprises. What previously was strict targets from the center now became soft suggestions.

Imagine you are a CTO and your workforce is heavily reduces and the goals you set are considered to be a mere suggestions. Not a very efficient instrument indeed. But not because it is overly-centralized.

[wasfgwp]

You are assuming the interest of people making those designs were aligned with the interests of consumers. They obviously were only to a very small degree since there were almost no incentives for Soviet companies to produce anything that wasn’t complete crap. Consumers had no choice since even the crap products they produced were hardly ever available to normal people anyway.

> USSR just wasn't rich enough

To an extent by choice. They really didn’t utilize the resources they had optimally.

[justsomehnguy]

> USSR just wasn't rich enough to afford experimentation and innovation. Resources (including human brain power) were quite limited. So they had to copy proven solutions. Simple as that.

"me good other stupid" in a nutshell.

[WorldMaker]

I think the "anything computing was seen as state secrets thing" is also possibly easiest to see in any documentaries and books on the history of Tetris (including the 2023 movie on Apple TV+). It's weird to say that Tetris was one of the most innovative software programs in USSR history and that the USSR almost crushed it before it had a chance to soar in the minds and dreams of millions of players, but that's basically what it was.

Even accepting the counter-narrative that the story of Tetris was "evil" capitalists taking advantage of the USSR to "steal" Tetris from the people of the USSR and the output of their socialist labor, the USSR was never in the position to offer Tetris to every worker in the country as a gift for their hard work because it was a state secret and computing wasn't something everyone had access to.

It is interesting to ponder if the USSR had made different decisions on the usefulness of general computing for the masses rather than the military what would have happened to Tetris as one interesting microcosm of the USSR's relationship to computing.

[przemelek]

It wasn't a lack of raw brainpower or wealth; it was a structural and ideological failure of resource allocation.

The USSR and the Iron Curtain bloc had a massive population and world-class scientific talent. The problem was that the Soviet system viewed independent thought and individuality as a threat, actively sabotaging its own geniuses:

Persecution of Top Minds: Sergei Korolev, the literal architect of the Soviet space program, was sent to the Gulag, where he lost his teeth to scurvy and survived a broken jaw before being pulled out to work in a sharashka (a prison lab). Andrei Sakharov, the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, was relentlessly persecuted and exiled later in life for pointing out systemic flaws.

Ideology Over Reality: The state actively banned the teaching of modern genetics for decades because Trofim Lysenko’s fraudulent agricultural theories were deemed "more communist."

When you look at where the USSR did choose to spend its massive resources, it wasn't on pragmatic, cost-saving solutions. It was on hyper-expensive, top-down military prestige projects—many of which the West mathematically evaluated and discarded as impractical.

They built the RBMK reactors (like the one at Chernobyl) specifically because the dual-use design allowed them to generate civilian electricity while simultaneously harvesting plutonium for weapons, creating a fundamentally unstable system. They spent fortunes building the "Caspian Sea Monster" (a giant ground-effect vehicle) and the Tsar Bomba.

The tragedy of the Soviet computer industry wasn't a lack of money or smart people. It was that any "von Neumann" or "Seymour Cray" born in the USSR who asked the wrong questions or challenged a party bureaucrat's stupid idea was far more likely to end up in a labor camp than heading an independent tech company.

Those born in countries like Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia were usually "asked" to leave country and they were working for the West ;-)

[BoxOfRain]

> They built the RBMK reactors (like the one at Chernobyl) specifically because the dual-use design allowed them to generate civilian electricity while simultaneously harvesting plutonium for weapons, creating a fundamentally unstable system.

It was more that the RMBK was more designed around existing Soviet manufacturing capacity, they could and did build more conventional reactor designs as well but they required enormous pressure vessels the USSR only had one factory to produce. The RBMK on the other hand is not a monolithic pressure vessel, it's a collection of hundreds of individual pressurised tubes which were much easier for the Soviet manufacturing base to produce. It was actually a clever idea on the face of it, the problem was more it had inherently dangerous behaviour in certain regimes (the infamous positive void coefficient of reactivity) and the positive scram effect wasn't known until well into their deployment. The operators were also given contradictory operating instructions which failed to highlight the safety-critical nature of certain parameters.

[Insimwytim]

> Sergei Korolev, the literal architect of the Soviet space program, was sent to the Gulag, where he lost his teeth to scurvy and survived a broken jaw

That's just a scary tale, that was created long after he died.

> Trofim Lysenko’s fraudulent agricultural theories were deemed "more communist."

Not exactly. His "fraudulent" theories delivered real value, and saved millions of people from starving. But he didn't belong to fancy scientific establishment (which traveled to conferences abroad while studying things with no impact to the people). He was a regular man, with experience working on land and with an aim for a practical results. He was not from "the club". So said establishment hated him and seized the first opportunity to attack him. Said establishment in all forms and shapes still hates him and other talented outsiders.

Discussion between Trofim Lysenko and his challengers actually public - you can read it yourself, not distorted conclusion-ready version presented by his haters.

I'm not saying you are wrong on all counts, but at least with those two examples you seem to just follow the usual narrative.

[lstodd]

Oh my, we have an actual Stalinist here.

[lo_zamoyski]

> Those born in countries like Poland

One famous example is Jacek Karpiński [0]. Soviet pressure, opposition to the use of Western parts, and intense jealousy of the commie state bureaucracy which sought to hold a monopoly over computer production (e.g., through the state-owned companies Odra and Elwro) halted production.

Here's some English language documentation for one of his models (the K-202) which was exported to the UK [1]. (The state-produced Mera 400, a heavily modified version of the K-202, did achieve a great deal of success, however, despite high production costs.)

There was an article posted here about him about 10 years ago [2].

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacek_Karpi%C5%84ski

[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20241012182627/https://www.zenke...

[2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41072026

[przemelek]

Exactly, and Jacek Karpiński is the perfect tragic example of this dynamic.

It's worth noting that Poland was actually one of the least ideologically rigid countries in the Eastern Bloc. While you couldn't openly oppose the regime, it was entirely possible to have a brilliant career in science or medicine (like Zbigniew Religa, who pioneered Poland's heart transplantation program) without strictly toeing the Party line.

Yet even in Poland's relatively relaxed climate, Karpiński’s revolutionary K-202 was strangled by bureaucratic jealousy, state monopolies (Elwro), and the paranoia of central planners.

If that was the fate of an innovator in Poland, imagine how much worse it was inside the borders of the USSR proper. The Soviet system operated on a near-literal interpretation of totalitarian control, where maintaining absolute party monopoly over every facet of life was prioritized above efficiency, wealth, or technological progress.

In that environment, independent thinkers weren't just seen as eccentric or inconvenient—they were viewed as a systemic security threat. When a system treats structural innovation as a form of ideological deviance, the safest thing for a genius to do was to keep quiet, escape to the West, or risk ending up neutralized by the state. You can't build an "alien spaceship" computing paradigm when the system's primary metric of success is total bureaucratic obedience.

[stasomatic]

My first PC was an Atari 800XL smuggled in from Krakow stuffed somewhere in my dad’s Volga’s chassis, circa ‘87, with cassette player and I joystick. I played The Revenge of Montezuma until I could play it just by sound on the hell settings. We did have some minis in my uni in Odessa, they had Fortran but I think we just played Pong on them.

I really wanted an MSX looking box though, that we played Karateka on in some precursors of Internet cafes, they looked the business, like high end Japanese hifi gear of the era.