[akersten]

> Because the photos and videos are analyzed on your child's device, Apple doesn't receive an indication that nudity was detected and doesn't get access to the photos or videos as a result.

Apropos of nothing, I really don't love the construction of this reassurance. This is not actually a reasoned-through guarantee, it's just two things that happen to be true at the same time. But the latter could change at any point, on-device processing does not preclude the device notifying Apple about what it saw.

[runjake]

The backdrop to this is a story from 2023 in which Apple attempted to do this and faced backlash. This received significant coverage worldwide at the time.

https://www.wired.com/story/apple-photo-scanning-csam-commun...

[dyauspitr]

But why would they want to be notified. Seems like this is the best case scenario for them. They’re taking action against the problem and at the same time cannot be approached to break their clients privacy. The only thing I can imagine is a government entity making them do it.

[akersten]

Yeah, it's clear to see that they'd want to get in front of something like that happening again. My point though is that the pull quote I highlighted is a flimsy reassurance because "it all happens on the device" does not at all prevent "Apple knowing about it," yet the sentence is constructed in a way that (tricks?) people into thinking it would.

[altairprime]

That’s true of of every privacy guarantee made by all software. For example: the only guarantee we have that Tor Browser isn’t phoning home usage statistics is 1) that people are inspecting its outbound network traffic with a magnifying glass, and it isn’t; 2) and so over time their guarantee has been accepted as trustworthy. So, no curing assurance can ever be made to the point you’re concerned about, other than to recommend not using software if one assigns high priority to this threat model. So, then, as someone who does, it would be useful to understand your viewpoint in a more concrete/applied sense. I have a handful of questions:

How would you rewrite Apple’s copy to reflect this universal threat? Would you advise GrapheneOS to adopt similar copy (since the concern is equally applicable, what with five nines of users not self-compiling from inspected source) to chip away at Apple’s marketing here? Is your concern restricted to ‘nudity-encountered’ metrics (as in the topic of this post) or is it generic to all ‘xyz-encountered’ metrics, or to all metrics, or..?

[dns_snek]

You misunderstood and it's really simple. Implying that on-device scanning makes it impossible for them to access any information is misleading. Just drop that faulty reasoning because it creates a dangerous misunderstanding of how technology works.

To illustrate: Because I wrote this comment, the sun is going to rise again tomorrow.

[ribosometronome]

And since then, we've seen major companies pressured into instead ripping out E2E encryption from public and governmental child safety concerns.

[an0malous]

How is that “apropro of nothing”? Isn’t it apropro of the quote from the article you’re commenting on?

[akersten]

Sure, what I meant is "without actually taking a stance on what the article is about and opinions on Apple's feature aside, I dislike the particular placation presented within"