[sandeepkd]

To be honest I do not know how to respond to this, cause this plays out quite often this way and sounds pretty convincing on surface. Unfortunately this is the gap between theory and implementation. There is a reason why the ROOT credentials are called ROOT. In case of anything going wrong, all your regular user accounts would be locked, see how you lock yourself out of this circular dependency. ONE SHOULD NEVER NOT PUT THEIR ROOT CREDENTIALS IN THE SECRET MANAGER OF SAME ACCOUNT. Its a classical circular problem, compilers compiler type. For AWS itself they have this additional concept of management account that allows you to defer this problem to just one more level.

Bottomline, you can have any number of boxes to lock other boxes and put their key to bounding box, ultimately there would be one outermost box that is locked by key which is not in any box

[antonvs]

> In case of anything going wrong, all your regular user accounts would be locked

You're talking about a very specific and rare scenario, and certainly not something that justifies storing all your passwords in plaintext in a CSV file.

In almost all scenarios where you would need root credentials, having them in the provider's secret manager is fine.

Obviously you need to store root credentials outside of the secret manager as well, but that should be a "break glass" scenario that's only used in emergencies. And you don't store them in plaintext CSV.

> Unfortunately this is the gap between theory and implementation.

I don't disagree that there are many, many organizations that practice bad security. But that doesn't mean there are none that have good security. And one would expect CISA to have good security, otherwise there's really no point in its existence.

There's a difference between saying "this is what most organizations are like" and "this is the way it has to be". The former is true, the latter is false.