[Joel_Mckay]

The Market has spoken, and people use standard consumer CPU/GPU-bodge architecture in cloud data centers. Sure there are a few quality of life features different from budget retail products, but we abandoned what Sun solved with a simple encrypted mmu decades ago.

The paper adds little to TCSEC/"Orange Book"/FOLDOC publications. Yet the poster doesn't deserve all the negative karma.

On a consumer CPU/GPU/NPU, software just isn't going to be enough to fix legacy design defects. Have a great day. =3

[convolvatron]

in larger systems the utility of sharing a single cpu/gpu complex between independent authorization domains kind of goes away. if you have 10,000 units of allocation, it never makes sense to try to share one of those until you have more than 10,000 jobs, and even then.

so it seems a lot more feasible to control access and sharing between those units and write of off the intranode case as a lost cause

[Joel_Mckay]

In such arrangements, one has essentially enforced high-latency similar context isolation using encrypted/VLAN network fabric, and pushed coordination/permissions into back-plane supervisory subsystems. Still creating a monolithic permission domain vulnerability within the entire n<10000 node cluster partition.

Likely doesn't help OS users either way. Best regards =3

[convolvatron]

you kinda missed my point. already in the cluster the important filesystem is the distributed one. the important job management system is the distributed one. the local OS just effectively supports the single process that we really care about. so the distributed context is where we add capabilities and actually manage access and resources. that is the real OS.