[padjo]

So in summary:

- a writable shared global cache is made available to PRs opened from forks by randomers.

- that cache is reused in the deploy pipeline

- deploys can be made with a single authentication factor, stored on the CI server

- the repository apparently does nothing to check for malicious deploys, delegating that to 3rd parties to do after the code is in the wild.

- by default the package manager runs random code when a package is updated

What a world we live in.

[olejorgenb]

And the gotcha has been known about since 2014:

> This is the class of attack documented by Adnan Khan in 2024. It's not a TanStack-specific bug; it's a known GitHub Actions design issue that requires conscious mitigation.

While it seems the maintainers kinda went-out-of-their way to enable this - GitHub could easily have at least turned of cache-sharing between fork jobs and the main jobs...