[PurpleRamen]

The insecurity is part of the benefit. Obsidian being so open, allowing easy customizing is what makes it great. They should add some more bells, whistles and guards to prevent sneaky social attacks, but they can't close Obsidian all together, or it would kill the app.

[fooqux]

There's open, and then there's "full disk access, even outside the vault" open.

[tredre3]

What do you propose? Even if they configure node's lowest level file APIs to block any access to paths outside the vault, plugins can still execute arbitrary shell commands who will have access to the entire OS.

And before you say it's useless and should be stopped too, well, that's a fine opinion! But then you lose plugins providing git integration, automated backups, document conversion using pandoc, etc. Many users might value that greatly.

A permission system for their plugins might be the only solution, annoying permission request popups and all.

[fooqux]

That's a good point. I think I'd solve this in two steps.

0) scripts and plugins should only be able to operate on the text in the vault. Just like how I expect a snippet of JavaScript running in my browser to only have access to the website and not to my entire disk.

1) Any commands that run outside of this sandbox need to be approved first. Obviously this could get annoying, but there's tricks you could use here to help.

Obviously this is a high level approach and I'm not on their team, so this is basically armchair programming. But since you asked, it's okay. ;)