[charcircuit]

>How about being banned from online banking, government services and all social networking / communication platforms?

You aren't banned. You just have to use a secure device. It's like saying that a store banned you because they stopped taking checks and started requiring a credit card since they are more secure and harder to commit fraud with. As a person you didn't lose any freedom. Freedom does not mean someone has to be able to force their will on another person. That sounds like the opposite of freedom to me.

>What makes you think they will give us this magical hypervisor capability?

It's not magical. Look at Windows WSL2 which already works like that.

[przmk]

It's not about being secure. Google allows devices with up to 10 years without any patches to pass their integrity API. Meanwhile Graphene OS, which is very secure and up-to-date, doesn't pass.

[notpushkin]

This. Plus if I want to access my bank account on a device I trust, the bank shouldn’t say “hey we don’t trust it so buzz off”. It’s my money in that account.

I understand there’s some stupid compliance thing that makes banks do this, but it clearly isn’t a hard requirement, as there’s still plenty of banks that don’t participate in this security theatre.

[pocksuppet]

To be fair to your bank, it has to cover you if your money gets stolen through a hack through their app, no matter what your operating system is.

[notpushkin]

I’d very much love to have an option to waive that cover though! Just give me a scary warning “hey, we’ve determined your device is unsafe; so if you get hacked through that device, you agree not to hold us liable for that. proceed? [y/N]”

For more specific mitigations, they could issue shorter-living tokens to such devices, in case it gets stolen and it didn’t store the token properly (say, the user did something stupid like “hey I’ll substitute secure enclave with a shim that writes secrets to an SD card”). And they could limit certain critical functions that do require attestation for some reason (e.g. Host Card Emulation, aka “tap your phone to pay”, which they usually delegate to Google Wallet/Pay/Wallet anyway).

Wise seems to do it correctly. It works on rooted phones, even, just gives a scary warning and blocks some app functions. They also have a fully functional webapp, so you mostly don’t need the app anyway. Revolut, on the other hand, has outright blocked me from my account – so I’m not using it anymore.

[pocksuppet]

You may waive that cover, but when (not if) you get hacked and your money gets stolen, someone still has to pay it back or you will die. Neither of those options are okay with the government and only one is okay with your bank.

[charcircuit]

I am talking about attestation in general. I already left a comment in the thread agreeing with you.

[mike_hearn]

They allow old devices to report to Play Integrity. That doesn't mean the service provider requesting attestation has to allow such devices. These things usually give just a risk grade to the service provider and it's up to them to make the decision.

Graphene OS says they are secure, but the definition of secure they're using isn't the same one the service providers are using, so that doesn't help much.

The best route forward here is to push for a separation of certification types. Ideally it would be possible to pass the security related aspects of Google's CTS test suite and get approved by Play Integrity without triggering the other parts of Android certification.

[dmantis]

> You just have to use a secure device.

No, you have to use government backdoored device. I.e. the most secure android rom (at least the only rom we know is not penetrable by state-sponsored celebrite based malware) is not covered by google's play protect, while bunch of outdated CVEd phones are.

Same will go with many hardened Linux machines, QubesOS, Whonix stations, you name it. I'd argue they are far more secure than any average windows/macos installation.

Hardware attestation has nothing to do with security, it's censorship.

[hollerith]

>QubesOS, Whonix stations, you name it. I'd argue they are far more secure than any average windows/macos installation.

OK, then let's see you argue it.

Most of the people who claim Linux is more secure have simplistic one-sentence arguments (e.g., "Linux is open-source, and many eyeballs make bugs shallow including bugs that are security holes") whereas those who say that MacOS and ChromeOS are more secure go into great technical detail as to why they think that.

[inejge]

> You just have to use a secure device.

Secure as defined by a duo of monopolists. It's a contractual concept and doesn't have a firm relation to security-related characteristics. I'd trust GrapheneOS to be as secure as anything Google is capable of releasing, but that doesn't help them if Google refuses to vouch for a device running their OS. Which is also why your check/credit card analogy falls flat.

[charcircuit]

Graphene supports attestation and any backend service can add support for handling it. No one is forcing people to only use two.