[lxgr]

You're not necessarily being surveiled just because you're forced to authenticate yourself. It often is the case practically, but it's not inherent, and mixing the two up makes the discussion too imprecise in a technical forum.

Hardware attestation often also has problems of centralization, but that's something else as well.

By just labeling it as an abstract bad thing without seeing nuance, I'm afraid you won't be convincing those in power to pass or block these laws, or those convincing your fellow voters which efforts to support.

[bigyabai]

> It often is the case practically, but it's not inherent

Oh my god. It's 2026, and we're still repeating the "I trust Apple/Google/Microsoft enough to resist the government" spiel.

Hardware attestation is a surveillance mechanism. If China was enforcing the same rule, you would immediately identify it as a state-driven deanonymization effort. But when the US does it, you backpedal and suggest that it could be implemented safely in a hypothetical alternate reality. Do you want to live in a dystopia?

[lxgr]

> Oh my god. It's 2026, and we're still repeating the "I trust Apple/Google/Microsoft enough to resist the government" spiel.

Who is?

> But when the US does it [...]

I don't live in the US, and while US is often setting global trends, in this case I don't think that's actually that likely, unless it somehow goes significantly better (i.e., the benefits actually vastly exceed the collateral damage to anonymity and resiliency via heterogeneity) than expected.

[xphos]

I think labeling this an abstract problem because all the existing implementations as having concrete but different problems is a little bit of a Motte and Bailey fallacy.

The surveillance of the future will be powered by the things we produce today. If the accepted algorithms leave cookies those cookies will be used tracked and monitized. The bad argument is the forced verification to do things on the internet. Making that start at the hardware is a lock in thats not okay. Business will always own the services and making standards that trade our practical liberty for the sake of security is a very compromised position in my opinion.

And it does start with the age verification, followed by id checks, etc. Its compromising precisely because no lines are drawn and no rights to privacy are codified in law. Without guiderails the worse path will likely be taken for maximum profit

[zx8080]

> You're not necessarily being surveiled just because you're forced to authenticate yourself.

Oh hell you do! Google profit comes from ADS! It's for their profit to surveil and track and deanonymize TO SELL ADS.

[whattheheckheck]

Having thought about ads, what is the ideal feedback info channel loop from manufacturers to consumers? How best to distribute the information of who can manufacture what at what cost/price and what does it do and when is it appropriate for consumers to receive or pull info from where? And if it ends up being a monopoly of 1 centralized system how do you allow for a competitor to break through without ads?

[MSFT_Edging]

Ads don't need to collect user information and form profiles. I don't understand why we must capitulate to more and more invasive advertising.

I don't know about you but I feel humiliated being forced to look at ads all day.

[Y_Y]

Catalogues

[lxgr]

A counterexample is not a valid refutation of the general point. It can be both true that Google will deanonymize you, given the chance, and that anonymous attestation is possible.

[xinayder]

Those in power who need convincing are the same ones pushing for mass surveillance online.