| > There was no bug or attack on Debian since 2007 that reproducible packages would prevent. I'm reading this as a suggestion that the reproducible builds effort was an ineffective deterrent. However, note that your observation could also be explained by the opposite: the reproducible builds effort was an effective deterrent, so nobody bothered with attempts. > And it just ups the the contribution barrier to Debian higher Until yesterday, the package just got flagged in the tracker, and you could either ignore it, or fix it yourself, or the kind people behind the reproducible builds effort supplied a patch themselves. Now, you can no longer ignore it. But fixes are often trivial. Use a (stable) timestamp provided by the build, seed RNGs with some constant (instead of eg: time), etc. These are best practices anyway. |
There was no attack that reproducible builds would help protect from before 2007 either.
> Until yesterday, the package just got flagged in the tracker, and you could either ignore it, or fix it yourself, or the kind people behind the reproducible builds effort supplied a patch themselves.
> Now, you can no longer ignore it. But fixes are often trivial. Use a (stable) timestamp provided by the build, seed RNGs with some constant (instead of eg: time), etc.
that's the entirety of the problem. App developers don't want to be package experts or build experts.
> These are best practices anyway.
They are not. They are best practices if you want reproducible builds. They are entirely useless waste of time if you don't care.