[farfatched]

Yes, making sure build timestamps are reproducible isn't a security win.

What is a win is that two independent parties can run the same build, and get the same binaries.

This is important because it removes trust from builders: anyone can verify their output.

It just so happens that unimportant things like build versions impede that.

[charcircuit]

Anyone can verify the actual code in the binary matches even if some bytes within the binary file itself are different. The verification routine doesn't have to be a basic bit for bit equality test.

[farfatched]

For sure.

This has been the status quo in Debian for a while now. You can build, and use diffoscope to audit the differences.

It's a stronger security property to have bit-for-bit reproducibilty, and it looks like Debian are ready to commit to it.

[charcircuit]

You are just restating the point of the thread and not addressing the low return on investment doing this is.

[farfatched]

Fair point.

I had figured the cost would decrease in time as deterministic builds became the norm (i.e. build tools stop including build timestamps).

I agree that it might not have positive POI. Bit tricky for me to judge.