[ekidd]

The unfortunate reality is that a lot of software does have hard constraints. And a lot of these constraints are "gatekept" by regulators, compliance policies, insurance companies, etc. If someone slops together a medical record system, and leaks a bunch of PHI, there will be consequences, even in the US. Similarly, good luck getting insurance against cyber attacks without a SOC2 audit or equivalent.

I've had this conversation with managers in multiple organizations this year: "Yes, you could totally vibe code that instead of paying for a SaaS. But you have strict contractual and professional obligations about data security. Do you want to be deposed and asked, 'So, did you really just vibe code the system that led to the data leak? Did the vibe coders have any professional qualifications? Did they even look at the code?'"

Similarly, a backend server that handles 8 million users a day is expected to stay up.

Now, there are 10,000 things that have less demanding requirements. I'm actually really delighted that people are able to vibe code their own tools with minimal knowledge of software engineering! We have been chronically underproducing niche software all along.

But if your software already has on-call shifts (and SLAs, etc) like the GP, then I think you want to be smart about how you combine human expertise with LLMs.

[skydhash]

That’s why the biggest proponent of LLM tooling are managers and entrepreneurs (aka people that are incentivized to reduce costs due to salary costs). But anyone that has to keep the system running and doesn’t want to wake up in the middle of the night is rightly cautious.

[kasey_junk]

I’m literally tasked with reliability engineering and llms are far and away the biggest boost in that in my career.

[threecheese]

To be fair, that’s a role which most companies don’t have; even if they have a titled “SRE”, many times it’s a sysadmin in a hat, looking very tired and nervous. It must be fun right now tho

[tptacek]

OK, I have no idea who you are, and this isn't personal, I'm responding to a comment and not a person --- but this is an argument that posits that one of the big problems with LLM software is "SOC2 audits". Since SOC2 audits are basically not a meaningful thing, I'm left wondering if the rest of your argument is similarly poorly supported.

It feels like a dunk to write that. But I genuinely do think there's so much motivated reasoning on both sides of this issue, and one signal of that is when people tip their hands like this.

[ekidd]

No offense taken.

I was going to argue that companies got to choose their own auditors, so of course there were some bad ones out there. But looking at the market, it seems like (1) the race to the bottom has gotten ridiculous, and (2) the insurance companies do not currently trust the auditors in any meaningful way. So, yeah, point to you.

Once upon a time, I went through SOC2 audits where the auditors asked lots of questions about Vault and really tried to understand how credentials got handled. Sure, that was exceptional even at the time.

But that still leaves a whole pile of other audits and regulatory frameworks I need to comply with. Probably most of these frameworks will eventually accept "The code was written by an LLM and reviewed by an actual programmer." I am less certain that you'll be able to get away with vibe coding regulated systems any time soon.

[tptacek]

SOC2 has never been about software resilience. You can create a set of attestations that will require you to present evidence to your auditors (who are ~accountants and will not know what the dotted quads of an IP address mean) about software quality, but there is no reason to do that and most organizations don't. SOC2 cares a great deal more about access management (in the "plotting on spreadsheet" sense) than it does about vulnerabilities.

My thing here is: you want to summon some kind of deus ex machina reason why the unpredictability (say) of agent-generated software will fail in the real world, but the concrete one you came up with fails to make that argument, pretty abruptly. Which makes me think the argument is less about the world as it is and more about the world as you'd hope it would be, if that makes sense.

[yellowapple]

Since when are SOC audits not a meaningful thing?

[kasey_junk]

If soc audits are driving your development process you are doing it backwards. And _certainly_ a time is coming when just using the llm will be soc compliant.

[threecheese]

I’d think any company big enough or working in certain markets which has a Compliance Officer cares about this; regulations are a legitimate business risk, and software integration contracts have security control compliance requirements which very much impact the sdlc.

Would you have the same reaction to requiring an approval for a production deployment? That’s driving the development process.

—-

Also jfc I need to cool it with the buzzwords, sorry I just got home from “talk like this all day” $job

[tptacek]

SOC2 is generally regarded as a joke and has in fact almost nothing to do with software resilience even on its own terms.

[yellowapple]

A joke or not, a lot of organizations take SOC compliance and auditing seriously. Responding to someone requiring it with “who cares, the accountants doing the audits don't know anything anyway” is unlikely to go well.