[SwellJoe]

Is Wikipedia conscious? It's a system operating on a lot of data. Is Google search conscious? It knows everything. Very complicated algorithms. Surely at some scale Google search must become a real live boy? When does it wake up and by what mechanism does that happen?

The frontier models are more complex and operate on more data than Wikipedia, but they are less complex and operate on less data than Google search in its entirety.

And, I'm not anthropocentric at all. I think apes and dolphins and some birds and probably some other critters are conscious. I mean they have a sense of self, and others, they have wants and needs and make decisions based on them.

This is a case where the person making extraordinary claims needs to provide the extraordinary evidence. It's extraordinary to claim that matrix multiplication becomes conscious if only it's got enough numbers. How many numbers do you reckon? Is my phone a living thing because it can run Gemma E4B? It answers questions. It'll write you a poem if you ask. It certainly knows more than some humans. What size makes an LLM come alive?

[nandomrumber]

What explains the emergent abilities of generative pre-trained transformers at massive-scale? Abilities that the smaller GTP’s don’t possess.

Simple programs can give rise to very complex behaviour. Conway’s game of live is Turing Complete and has four rules.

Conway’s Game of Live can simulate a Turing machine, can therefore implant a GTP.

Does that mean Conway’s Game of Life is conscious? I don’t think so.

Does it rule out Conway’s Game of life from implementing a system that has consciousness as an emergent ability?

I’m not convinced I know the answer.

[SwellJoe]

"What explains the emergent abilities of generative pre-trained transformers at massive-scale? Abilities that the smaller GTP’s don’t possess."

What "emergent" abilities do you mean? In my experience, smaller models behave exactly as I would expect a model with a lot fewer data and fewer connections between the data to behave. It is a difference of scale and not of kind when comparing Gemma 4 E2B (which runs on literally any modern computing device, including a CPU in a modest laptop or phone) to the current frontier models. Each step up adds more knowledge of how to do more things, and more working memory and tool capability to do more, but it does not look anything like a line being crossed into sentience, to me. They all still seem like machines. If you compare outputs across each step up in size and capability, which is something I've done, you'll see incremental improvements. You won't see a sudden spark where it's a different type of thing, it's just gradually getting more capable.

I think the memory features companies are sticking on these things is detrimental to mental health. It adds to the illusion that there's something else happening, other than some equations being calculated with some randomness thrown in. But, it's just the model querying the memory database (whatever form that takes) because it's been instructed to do so. The model doesn't want to know anything about who it's talking to. It's just following the system prompt. That doesn't make it your friend. Humans will see a face on the moon, that doesn't mean the moon will be my friend, either.

[markburns]

> What explains the emergent abilities of generative pre-trained transformers at massive-scale?

I don't see why the abilities couldn't be an encoded modelling of enough of the world to produce those abilities. It seems like a simple enough explanation. Less data, less room to build a model of how things work. More data, sufficient room to build a model.

Conway's Game of Life is then not conscious in and of itself, because there's not enough in its encoded data to result in emergent behaviour beyond what we see.

If we expand it to also include a vast amount of data such as a Turing machine running an LLM then we can reasonably say we are closer to saying that that configuration of it is conscious.

It's not the firing-of-neurons mechanism and its relevant complexity or simplicity that make us conscious or not.

It's not the GoL algorithm that would make the machine conscious either.

It's the emergent behaviour of a sufficiently complex system.

The system _including_ its data.

[markburns]

To the first questions. No and no. But potentially where consciousness lives is emergent behaviour in systems with iterative feedback loops.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Am_a_Strange_Loop

I personally think we'll need a few more feedback loops before you have more human-like intelligence. For example, a flock of LLM agent loops coming to consensus using short-term and long-term memory, and controlling realtime mechanical, visual and audio feedback systems, and potentially many other systems that don't mimic biological systems.

I also think people will still be debating this way beyond the singularity and never conceding special status to intelligence outside the animal kingdom or biological life.

It's quite a push for many people to even concede animals have intelligence.

For the extraordinary claims/evidence, it's also the case that almost any statement about what consciousness is in terms of biological intelligence is an extraordinary claim that goes beyond any evidence. All evidence comes from within the conscious experience of the individual themselves.

We can't know beyond our own senses whether perception exists outside of our own subjective experience. We cannot truly prove we are not a brain in a jar or a simulation. Anything beyond assertions about the present moment and the senses that the individual experiences are just pure leaps of faith based on the persistent illusion, or perceived persistent illusion of reality (or not).

We know really nothing of our own consciousness and it is by definition impossible to prove anything outside of it, from inside the framework of consciousness.

If we can somehow find a means to break outside of the pure speculation bubble of thoughts and sensations and somehow prove what human experience is, then we may be in a position to make assertions about missing evidence for other forms of intelligence or experience.

But until then definitions of both human and artificial intelligence remain an exercise for the reader.