[fsflover]

> So, not being vulnerable is dependent on not doing something that can make you vulnerable? That doesn't seem right. If you can do something to make yourself vulnerable, you are vulnerable.

On the one hand, you are right, and I rather meant "not exploitable", since technically the vulnerability is still there. On the other hand, yes, any security does rely on you not doing something stupid like "curl | sudo bash".

> "In-VM attack only". That's disingenuous.

It's really not. Hardening of guest OSes is out of scope of Qubes. You are supposed to not combine trusted and untrusted actions in a single VM, so intra-VM security is really secondary. I really recommend you to read my link about organizing the workflows.

You have a good point concerning the integrity issues though.

[kuhsaft]

> On the one hand, you are right, and I rather meant "not exploitable", since technically the vulnerability is still there.

And I'm fine with that. I think, the Qubes OS notices should use that terminology as well. Though, some of the vulnerabilities are exploitable, if you don't follow the Qubes OS guides to the T.