[brotchie]

Originally rejected the paper premise, but I get it now, certainly made me question my belief that consciousness binds to any arbitrary information processing that's of sufficient complexity.

IIUC the author is saying that the human brain is running directly on "layer zero": chemical gradients / voltage changes, while AI computes on an abstraction one layer higher (binary bit flips over discretized dyanmics).

In essence, our brains are running directly on the "continuous" physical dynamics of the universe, while AI is running on a discretization of this (we're essentially discretizing the physical dynamics and to create state changes of 0 -> 1, 1 -> 0).

My currently belief is that consciousness is some kind of field or property of the universe (i.e. a universal consciousness field) that "binds" to whatever information processing happens in our wet ware. If you've done intense meditation / psychedelics, there's this moment when it becomes obvious that you are only "you" due to some kind of universal consciousness's binding to your memory and sensory inputs.

The "consciousness arises from information processing," i.e. the consciousness field binds to certain information processing patterns, can still hold, and yet not apply to AI (at least in its current form): The binding properties may only apply to continuous processes running directly on the universe's dynamics, and NOT to simulations running on discretized dynamics.

[tsimionescu]

> while AI is running on a discretization of this (we're essentially discretizing the physical dynamics and to create state changes of 0 -> 1, 1 -> 0).

But this is just a discretization we impose when we try to represent the system for ourselves. The reality is that the AI is a particular time-ordered relation between the continuous electric fields inside the CPU, GPU, and various other peripherals. We design the system such that we can call +5V "1" and 0V "0", but the actual physical circuits do their work regardless of this, and they will often be at 2V or 0.7V and everywhere in between. The physical circuit works (or doesn't) based exclusively on the laws of electricity, and so the answer of the LLM is a physical consequence of the prompt, just as a standing building is a physical consequence of the relationships between the atoms inside its blocks. The abstract description we chose to use to build this circuit or this building is irrelevant, it's just the map, not the territory.

[dwb]

The computer and the program wouldn't exist without us, though. They only exist to be interpreted by us. The physical properties of the circuits outside of what we cajole them into doing are irrelevant, meaningless. The circuits only do their work regardless of particular interpretations; they wouldn't exist at all without people building them to be interpreted.

[tsimionescu]

The physical computer could exist regardless of us. The program, if by that we mean "a human model of the computation happening in a physical computer" is just a description, yes.

It would be extraordinarily unlikely, but physically conceivable, that a physical system that is organized exactly like a microcontroller running an automatic door program, together with a solar panel, a basic engine, and a light sensor, could form randomly out of, say, a meteorite falling in a desert. If that did happen, the system would produce the same "door motor runs when person is near sensor" effect as the systems we build for this.

The physical circuit are doing what they are doing because of physics. They don't care why they happen to be organized the way they are - whether occurring by human design or through random chance.

Edit: I can add another metaphor. Consider buildings: clearly, buildings are artificial objects, described by architectural diagrams, which are purely human constructs, and couldn't be built without them. And yet, there exist naturally occurring formations that have the same properties as simple buildings - and you can draw architectural diagrams of those naturally occurring formations; and, assuming your diagrams are accurate, you can predict using them if the formations will resist an earthquake or collapse. Physical computers are no different from artificial buildings here, and the logic diagrams and computer programs are no different from the architectural diagrams: they are methods that help us build what we want, but they are still discovered properties of the physical world, not idealized objects of our own making; the fact that naturally occurring computers are very unlikely to form doesn't change this fact.

[dwb]

I disagree that it’s conceivable that a computer could somehow exist without a conscious maker. It’s so unlikely that it may as well be impossible. If something non-human that was capable of consciousness did form in the universe, through known biology or not, it would “just” be another form of life, and not what the paper is talking about.

What you say about buildings is sort of true as far as it goes, but irrelevant for the argument because buildings aren’t symbolic manipulation machines that only mean something via conscious interpretation, that some people are claiming could gain consciousness themselves.

[tsimionescu]

Probability of such a structure forming is completely irrelevant. The argument makes sense if there was a mathematical/physical impossibility, but as long as the laws of physics allow such an object to exist and form by random chance, and predict it would operate exactly the same as the consciousness-designed one, I don't see any reason to discount it.

I also think the arguments against this are contradictory. On the one hand, we have an argument that says that computers only work because a consciousness built them to implement a particular computation. On the other hand, we're saying that the same physical computer doing the same physical thing can be interpreted to be implementing an infinite number of different computations. These two seem to point in different directions to me.

[brotchie]

This is a good counter argument to the paper, honestly.

[TimTheTinker]

I think a better counter is the question "Is there a meaningful difference between binary discretization and Planck units? Aren't those discrete/indivisible as well?"

[tsimionescu]

That's not really a good counter - Planck units are not a discretization. Space-time is continuous in all quantum models, two objects can very well be 6.75 Planck lengths away from each other. The math of QM or QFT actually doesn't work on a discretized spacetime, people have tried.

[tsimionescu]

I should add one thing here: no theory that is consistent with special relativity can work on a discretized spacetime, because of the structure of the Lorrentz transform. If a distance appears to be 5 Planck units to you, it will appear to be 2.5 Planck units to someone moving at half the speed of light relative to you in the direction of that distance.

[bch8_]

I went on a very similar trajectory to you w.r.t to the paper (From a similar starting point too). Just wanted to mention that the idea you are describing here is in principle compatible with the theory that the brain is an analog computer: https://picower.mit.edu/news/brain-waves-analog-organization...

I have been been spinning my tires a bit trying to decide if I think this theory of the mind is able to avoid the abstraction fallacy.

[mrandish]

I thought your "layer zero" analogy was an interesting avenue to reason about but you lost me with:

> My currently belief is that consciousness is some kind of field or property of the universe (i.e. a universal consciousness field) that "binds" to whatever information processing happens in our wet ware.

First, because it requires a huge leap into fundamental and universal physical mechanics for which there is currently zero objective evidence. Second, it's based entirely on individual interpretation of internal subjective experience. While some others (but not all) report similar interpretations or intuitions during some induced altered states, I think the much simpler explanation is that the internal 'sense of self' we normally experience is only one property of our mental processes and the sense of unbinding you temporarily experienced was a muting or disconnection of that component while keeping the rest of your 'internal experience machine' running.

In your layer analogy, our sense of self may be akin to an interpreter running as a meta-process downstream of our input parser. Thus what you subjectively experienced while that interpreter was disconnected can seem alien and even profound. Neuroscientists have traced where in the brain the subjective sense of self emerges, so it's plausible it's a trait which can be selectively suppressed. Additionally, it's been demonstrated experimentally that subjectively profound experiences of universal connectedness sometimes described as spiritual, religious or metaphysical can be induced in a variety of ways.

[Terretta]

> currently zero objective evidence

There is — arguably, as in, it is argued — evidence for some sort of field of higher dimensionality than three, and recently communication between brain areas through the field rather than physically.

The more we uncover of the brain's functionality, the more it appears the physical parts we've tended to stare at are not themselves performing computation, but more like computation antennae: a theremin not only moved by, but that can move, the hand.

[bch8_]

Can you share this recent evidence about communication through fields?

[colordrops]

Is there a layer zero though? What does that even mean? It implies the universe is designed and built upon layers of abstraction. That's just in our heads though, not out there. The layered model is a human abstraction.

[brotchie]

It's the difference between:

  a) Actually pouring a cup of water into a pond (layer zero), and
  b) Running a fluid dynamics simulation of pouring a cup of water into a pond (some layer above layer zero).

[colordrops]

I understand the original framing which is what you are repeating. I'm saying the framing itself is an illusion. It's an arbitrary distinction and also implies fully understanding all the underlying processes that go into pouring a cup of water in a pond (we don't) and that running a fluid dynamics simulation is some trivial thing (it's not).

[brotchie]

Are you saying that, in some abstract sense, that actually pouring the cup may be isomorphic to running a perfect simulation of pouring the cup?

Genuinely curious about your statement that its an illusion / arbitrary distinction, to figure out if there's a gap in my thinking / reasoning. To me there's a clear distinction between the actual thing happening via physical dynamics vs. us (humans) having creating a discretized abstraction (binary computation) on top of that and running a process on that abstraction.

Maybe there's some true computational universality where the universes dynamics are discrete (definitely plausible) and there's no distinction between how a processes dynamics unfold: i.e. consciousness binds to states and state transitions regardless of how they are instantiated. I did use to hold this view , but now I'm not so sure.

[colordrops]

No, because calling them isomorphic would imply that we understand both processes well enough to make that comparison. Sorry I didn't reply sooner, HN blocked me for making three comments in a row.

[dwb]

It's not arbitrary because people are making exactly this distinction in order to argue that it's possible for computers to be conscious, which this paper argues against. So the distinction exists at least for the purposes of this argument. Whether it "really" exists of course depends on your perspective.