[fsflover]

> A GrapheneOS phone is just as open as the Librem 5.

No, it's not. Try to run a completely free OS on you hardware (like Replicant) and watch the lack of camera, GPS and more.

Related discussion for other: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47942070

[555244466]

The Librem 5 uses a bottom of the barrel, standard industrial CPU from 2017 with no updates. It is no more open than a Google Pixel or any other mobile device. it lacks proper updates, isolated radios, and any form of hardening. The kill switches are also useless if your device is fully compromised and turned into a spying device, all of your data is already gone. The only thing the switches do as a last resort is block voice recording, which is an improper way of doing it since speakers are essentially just microphones in reverse.

[fsflover]

> CPU from 2017 with no updates

This is false. Please stop writing false statements without any links. NXP promises to produce the i.MX 8M Quad until Jan. 2033. The support will be even longer.

> it lacks proper updates

This is FUD.

> isolated radios

They are isolated with USB. This might be slightly weaker than IOMMU, but for me the benefit of freedom is worth it. There is no shared memory.

> it lacks proper updates, isolated radios, and any form of hardening

FUD and false information. Please stop this.

> The kill switches are also useless if your device is fully compromised

This is false again. It doesn't matter how much my device might be compromised. The attacker will not get any access to the shut down sensors, radios or voice/video, if I use the three kill switches.

> since speakers are essentially just microphones in reverse

Librem 5 speakers do not support this.

[kuhsaft]

Not OP, but

> This is false. Please stop writing false statements without any links. NXP promises to produce the i.MX 8M Quad until Jan. 2033. The support will be even longer.

I think they meant that the processor itself is old. It supports ARMv8 and is lacking the enhanced memory protection and execution features of the ARMv9-A processors on newer phones.

> This is false again. It doesn't matter how much my device might be compromised. The attacker will not get any access to the shut down sensors, radios or voice/video, if I use the three kill switches.

The problem is that your device can be compromised quite easily and without you knowing. The kill switches are moot at that point.

[fsflover]

The kill switches will work independently on a compromise. Why are they moot? Also, it's possible to completely reflash the device in case of doubt.

"quite easily" strongly depends on what exactly you are doing. For example, if I use Firefox with NoScript, then it is not very easy.

[kuhsaft]

> The kill switches will work independently on a compromise. Why are they moot?

Kill switches only work as a security feature when you activate them before you know you're compromised. But that's impossible.

It's a reactive "security" feature not a proactive one.

> For example, if I use Firefox with NoScript, then it is not very easy.

Security vulnerabilities aren't only JS related.

https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2026-3...

https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2026-3...

Adding an extension that can access all your browsing data doesn't seem very secure either.

Required permissions:

- Access browser tabs

- Access browser activity during navigation

- Access your data for all websites

[fsflover]

> Kill switches only work as a security feature when you activate them before you know you're compromised. But that's impossible.

Indeed, if you use the kill switches in a stupid way, you get no benefit from them. I use them whenever I want to be sure that I can't be tracked or listened to, either because of a potentially compromised device or closed modem that can connect to towers without my knowledge. In other words, they are a proactive feature. I can get 100% privacy whenever I want, independently on any software, which in principle might always get secretly compromised one way or another. Even the amazing, secure GrapheneOS!

How can you be sure your modem on GrapheneOS doesn't send your location to the mothership all the time, even in an "airplane mode"?

[fsflover]

Good links, thank you. I agree that my protection is not perfect in general. Fortunately I do not open random websites on my phone; I have my laptop with Qubes OS for that.

> Adding an extension that can access all your browsing data doesn't seem very secure either.

This is not just a random extension but an officially recommended one, https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/recommended-extensions-.... It's also regularly verified by the community. I trust it as I trust Firefox.

[TommyTran732]

Quite frankly, the whole Librem ecosystem is significantly less "open" than GrapheneOS or any desktop Linux variant to anyone who look at things objectively instead of using weird FSF semantics.

Instead of loading firmware in sensible manner like GrapheneOS or desktop Linux distros with the linux-firmware package, they keep PureOS "free of blobs" by having the bootloader inject all of the blobs into memory in an extremely shady manner. Since when was having the bootloader tamper with system memory about freedom and openness?

Oh, and they even have the audacity to market this as the "firmware jail" as if it is any more contained than the linux-firmware package too. Truly impressive stuff.

[fsflover]

> Quite frankly, the whole Librem ecosystem is significantly less "open" than GrapheneOS or any desktop Linux variant to anyone who look at things objectively instead of using weird FSF semantics.

You will have a point when your Google phone runs Replicant. Now this is just empty words, i.e., FUD. Which blobs are running on the Librem 5 CPU? Which blobs are running on GrapheneOS CPU?

[TommyTran732]

Which blobs are running on the Librem 5 CPU? Which blobs are running on GrapheneOS CPU?

Both the Pixel and Librem 5 have firmware baked into the SoC that is executed.

On GrapheneOS, the firmware is signed and updated along with the OS.

On the Librem 5, the firmware for Wifi/Bluetooth is stored on a NOR chip, which is read from and mounted into the OS by the initramfs into /lib/firmware.

Not-withstanding the above, Librem 5 components such as the USB controller, touch screen controller, radios, battery, etc simply have closed-source firmware baked in (stored on some flash chip on these components), but it doesn't mean that they are not there or in use.

In both cases, components either do not get proper firmware updates from the OS, or they are too old/low quality to get any firmware updates from the vendors to begin with. Storing firmware on the component is also a less secure approach than having signed firmware loaded by the OS, as it now means that these components have persistent storage which can be attacked.

Aside from all of the above, they also use a dedicated CPU core to run firmware blobs for things like memory training.

In essence, what the Librem 5 has achieved is shuffling proprietary firmware storage around instead of eliminating their existence or execution. It is not any more "free" or "open" than anyone else while also being less secure.

[fsflover]

You keep repeating this everywhere. Consider reading what a Librem 5 developer says instead, https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47943487

Also, Librem 5 has "proper" firmware updates (whatever that means). Please do not spread false information.

[TommyTran732]

Since you copy pasta your response, I will link to my other comment and do a bit of copy pasta here:

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47953726

It is exactly how it works. Read the actual code for yourself: https://source.puri.sm/Librem5/librem5-fw-jail/-/blob/pureos...

If you can't read code, here is the marketing material: https://puri.sm/posts/shipping-new-sparklan-wifi-cards-with-...

If you don't know that the firmware for components/peripherals can either be uploaded to them by Linux or just stored on some flash chip on the component, read: https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/refer...

[kuhsaft]

> Which blobs are running on the Librem 5 CPU?

https://source.puri.sm/Librem5/fw

https://source.puri.sm/Librem5/fw/firmware-librem5-nonfree

https://source.puri.sm/Librem5/librem5-fw-jail/-/tree/pureos...

> Which blobs are running on GrapheneOS CPU?

Depends on the phone. Arguably though, GrapheneOS has the legacy of years of thousands of security researchers working to secure Android from third-party network and GNSS modules.

---

Just so you know, I'm not using Librem or GrapheneOS. I'm looking at this objectively and have no skin in the game.

[fsflover]

In this case I do not understand why you are ignoring the words of a Librem 5 developer saying that no blobs are running on the main CPU: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47943487

[kuhsaft]

I'll take his word that no blobs are running on the main CPU. But the process itself is error prone. It's mounting flash storage with blobs into the filesystem of the OS. The OS can load modules directly from the storage.

> There is not a single non-free blob in the OS that runs there once the bootloader is up (unless you put some there by yourself, which you're of course free to do).

"unless you put some there by yourself, which you're of course free to do" also means unless someone else puts one there.

---

I think the "firmware jail" loader also uses Smart Direct Memory Access (SDMA)?

---

You can run blobs on the main CPU with strong isolation with TEE and other hardware security features.

[TommyTran732]

The SOC still has firmware baked in as per usual.

And the firmware for Bluetooth/Wifi is loaded in by having the initramfs read it from the NOR flash, mount it in /lib/firmware, then it is business as usual like a desktop Linux distribution.

It's not something special. It's just a hackjob. They shuffle the files around and made it much harder to update.

https://source.puri.sm/Librem5/librem5-fw-jail/-/blob/pureos...

https://puri.sm/posts/shipping-new-sparklan-wifi-cards-with-...