[hellojesus]

I haven't seen new data from celbrite in awhile, but I believe that grapheneos was the only truly secure phone from it for both bfu and afu as of a couple years ago.

Apple lost my confidence after they removed Advanced Device Encryption for British users (plus implemented age verification for them).

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/14344-cellebrite-premium-ju...

[virgildotcodes]

I think it's been said that nobody has yet cracked Apple's Lockdown Mode, but that's likely not truly comparable?

[strcat]

iPhones with Lockdown Mode enabled have definitely been exploited which is confirmed by leaked documents and statements from commercial exploit vendors. Lockdown Mode primarily reduces attack surface in Safari and from Apple services. It does very little to protect against other attack vectors such as messaging apps or physical data extraction.

https://support.apple.com/en-ca/105120

You're thinking of Apple saying they haven't detected a case of a device with Lockdown Mode exploited in the wild themselves. Extremely few devices use Lockdown Mode and Apple has very little insight into successful exploits so there isn't much opportunity for them to detect it in the first place. Lockdown Mode bundles everything together and has very inconvenient changes many people won't accept. That greatly reduces usage even by people fully aware of it who want a lot of what it provides. For example, there's

Apple has said they haven't seen a case of a device with Lockdown Mode being exploited which is extremely misleading. Apple doesn't have that much visibility into devices being exploited and would mostly seen failed attempts. All of the Lockdown Mode functionality being bundled together contributes to it barely being used. There's no opt-out system for most of it beyond disabling it as a whole. Only a subset of the Safari restrictions can be partially disabled per-app and per-site which doesn't fully restore web compatibility. It's more that hardly anyone is using it and that Apple doesn't have much insight into apps and the OS being exploited successfully in the first place. Lockdown Mode is definitely useful but people should read about what it actually does and compare that to how devices get exploited. Apple's memory corruption exploit protections aren't tied to Lockdown Mode.

[soco]

How is then law enforcement getting what they need from people's iphones? Because I understand they do, in some way. And I'm not asking about forcing people to hand over pin or fingerprints, but just by themselves.

[strcat]

Lockdown Mode is focused on reducing the attack surface from Safari including the WebView and Apple services including iMessage/FaceTime. It does nearly nothing to protect against non-browser/non-messaging attack vectors in the OS or other apps. It's up to app developers to implement similar restricted modes and also baseline exploit protections. App developers need to explicitly opt-in to using the standard exploit protections used in many parts of the OS and Apple discourages doing it:

https://developer.apple.com/documentation/Xcode/enabling-enh...

[fsflover]

Here is one example how: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47716490

[varispeed]

iPhone security is a myth. This is because you can't scan iPhone for threats, so Apple can pretend they don't happen. iOS is probably the least secure platform there is thanks to the security by obscurity approach by Apple.

You can use iPhone being blissfully unaware it has malware on it even in Lockdown mode (which is essentially cope mechanism and Apple way of saying "we care about security, trust us bro").