[maxglute]

Leading edge semi that's already largely denied to PRC via export controls that overwhelmingly underpins US semi advantage and economy. Glassing TSMC would actually only close advanced semi gap between US and PRC by simply taking most of US semi high end pipeline offline. Meanwhile PRC retains the most complete semi supply chain, they don't have leading edge but they do have almost fully indigenized semi vs decentralized western semi, a lot of which are in PRC missile range.

> doesn't seem like such a bad deal

This fundamentally doesn't address that US would still retain security architecture in region, i.e. TW doesn't host much US hardware anyway - taking tw does not meaningfully shift security balance. The only way to ensure relative geopolitical sanctuary is to boot US forward basing out of East Asia, and to be blunt that is not something done peacefully from PRC side, i.e. unless US voluntarily abdicate from theatre and I don't see that happening. Now maybe PRC can establish overwhelmingly advantageous regional force balance that it's obvious to all US posture no longer security dilemma for PRC, but I wouldn't discount PRC simply wanting to remove US forces from regional equation just to be sure.

[JeremyNT]

TSMC is building US fabs though (or so they claim) so it's not solely a question of denial.

I guess more generally PRC can play a much longer game than the US, which seems intent on destroying its standing with the rest of the world by electing absolute buffoons every 4 years. How many years of this can allies tolerate?

Shutting down the strait of Hormuz for example is extremely damaging to US allies in Asia and we can expect more incompetence over time.

[maxglute]

There are many sole source fab suppliers in TW, Arizona fabs will run out of inputs and shut down. There maybe effort to fully indigenize TW semi supply chain outside TW, but I've not heard any credible policy/efforts.

There is scenario where US incompetence will negate security dilemma, but see how hard JP is hedging. I would not put money on it. The additional layer to this is US security architecture of of East Asia is not just US basing, but US hardware in general... forcing region to no longer operate US platforms that gathers intel for US MIC / break region interoperability (including data sharing) with US. PRC unlikely to convince JP/SKR/SG etc to abandon F35s politically (because alternative worse vs PRC), at least within lifespan of platforms. That requires glassing hardware and coercing alternate procurement.