[TommyTran732]

Man, if this entirely thread of people calling out how ridiculous the implementation is and the killswitch not actually working in practice isn't enough to convince you, nothing ever will.

I don't even feel like arguing against the absurdity of your arguments anymore. This is my last attempt at dumping it down a notch:

A "microphone killswitch" is supposed to protect the user against having their convos being snooped on when it's toggled and still be able to use the phone in a meaningful manner. A "microphone killswitch" that doesn't really function on its own and requires turning the entire device into a brick is non-fuctional for all practical purposes.

I might as well just invent a "microphone killswitch" that requires people to pull out the battery to make sure that they are not snooped on at that point.

[fsflover]

> A "microphone killswitch" is supposed to protect the user against having their convos being snooped on when it's toggled and still be able to use the phone in a meaningful manner

LOL, it's hard to imagine a more ridiculous and self-contradicting statement than this.

1. It's just physically impossible to defend from tracking, when the phone has networking connections on. Not even on all-mighty GrapheneOS.

2. I am using a phone with the kill switches off in a meaningful manner all the time. It is a full computer running a desktop OS and can run any apps, including listening to music from a microSD card, reading saved text/pdf files, showing presentations with original LibreOffice, programming in any language with standard tools, and so on.

3. Even though the phone in the lockdown mode (with all three kill switches off) has no connections, if I'm ever in emergency and need some help, I can turn the phone functionality back on and call for the help I need. Obviously, privacy in such case would be secondary after health.

4. Unlike for GrapheneOS, there is no way to hack my kill switches for any money. I can be 100% certain that they work as intended, even if a state actor is against me. Yes, everything else might be compromised in such case but not the tracking and listening to me when I need true location and microphone privacy.

[TommyTran732]

> It's just physically impossible to defend from tracking, when the phone has networking connections on. Not even on all-mighty GrapheneOS.

I can use GrapheneOS with the global mic toggled off and sensors toggled off/denied to apps. I can still text, browse the internet, and check my emails while talking to my friends. I can go about my day, receive notifications, be a productive member of society while being reasonably sure that no apps on my phone is snooping on my convos.

This is what most people expect of a "microphone killswitch". Unfortunately, the hardware killswitches on the Librem cannot provide even remotely the same level of assurances as even a software killswitch.

The Librem 5 is either fully offline or something can snoop on the convos while internet is on. How is that a sensible implementation?

> I am using a phone with the kill switches off in a meaningful manner all the time. It is a full computer running a desktop OS and can run any apps, including listening to music from a microSD card, reading saved text/pdf files, showing presentations with original LibreOffice, programming in any language with standard tools, and so on.

Yeah, I am sure this is what a sane person expects a functioning phone with a "microphone killswitch" to be - an offline pocket sized computer instead of a device for communication 99% of the time.

> Even though the phone in the lockdown mode (with all three kill switches off) has no connections, if I'm ever in emergency and need some help, I can turn the phone functionality back on and call for the help I need. Obviously, privacy in such case would be secondary after health.

Yes, I am sure the purpose of the phone is to make a call instead of being used for texting/receiving notifications when you are out and about.

> Unlike for GrapheneOS, there is no way to hack my kill switches for any money. I can be 100% certain that they work as intended, even if a state actor is against me. Yes, everything else might be compromised in such case but not the tracking and listening to me when I need true location and microphone privacy.

Ever considered that maybe, just maybe, a valid use case for most people is not necessarily to hide their location from the carriers 24/7 but to not have their private conversation snooped on?

Or perhaps, another valid use case that some people might want is the ability to be connected to the internet via Wifi while not having their location tracked by the carrier or their private conversations snooped on? I can give you another detailed explanation as to how standard Android has a location toggle that works while your desktop-Linux-in-a-phone can easily have the location tracked when Wifi is on (and without an OS compromise) if you'd like ;)

[fsflover]

> I can use GrapheneOS with the global mic toggled off and sensors toggled off/denied to apps.

You can only do that, if you are sure your software isn't compromised. You can never prove that, if your adversary is sufficiently big.