[DirtyCalvinist]

> In addition, while it is true that judgements of value cannot be reduced to judgements of facts (i.e. the "is-ought problem"), one must acknowledge that judgements of value must be based upon judgements of fact. If you're basing your values upon incorrect facts, your values are very likely to be mistaken. For example, if you state that another person is not deserving of moral consideration, that is a judgement of value which may or may not be valid. However, if your justification for that judgement is hearsay evidence or religious bias, then that judgement starts to look very shaky.

You've committed the same error. One ramification of the is-ought divide is that ultimately, ethical norms are assertions divorced from empirical basis. Saying that 'murder is wrong' is epistemologically very similar whether it is based on some religious text or something like "what would society be like if we allowed people to murder each other?". It is simply expressing a preference for one empirical state over another empirical state, and absent some transcendental determinant, no final conclusion can decisively be reached.

[TeMPOraL]

> It is simply expressing a preference for one empirical state over another empirical state, and absent some transcendental determinant, no final conclusion can decisively be reached.

But humans tend to universally value some states over other, and it seems to be hard-wired into our brains. I think that when the neuro/cognitive scientists finally disassemble our firmware, we should have a new, interesting take on this problem.