[shalmanese]

This is the classic tech person trying to sound smart in a domain outside of their expertise.

Fixed civilian infrastructure has never been safe. The way you protect it is diplomatically, by having that region not be attacked in the first place or putting incentives such that certain bits of infrastructure are considered off limits.

Secondly, people whose only experience of war comes from fictional media have a drastically distorted view of the impact of chemical explosives. The science of chemical explosives became a mature discipline pre-WWII. Our best chemical today are maybe 1.7x more dense than TNT and our standard chemical explosives are often sometimes less energy dense because we prioritize safety over explosive power.

The science of rocketry became mature in the 60s, for a given fuel quantity, we can roughly lob X mass Y distance at Z speed.

The only area we've made massive advancements is precision, relevant if you want to put a small bomb through a window to kill one guy, not so relevant if you want to hit an oil refinery that is several square km wide.

The long and the short of it is that there's a massive, misunderstood gap between temporarily disabling something and destroying it. Take the Crimea bridge for example, back in 2022, there was a massive, high profile truck bombing that completely destroyed the center part of the bridge. However, it was fully repaired within 4 months. Subsequent, there have been 3 more attacks, and repaired every time and still transporting vital war materiel [1]. Concrete and steel are heavy. Even if left 100% undefended, the amount of weaponry needed to totally destroy the bridge, such that it could not be used for 3 years+ is a substantial chunk of Ukraine/US weapon's arsenal. Same goes for every power plant, oil refinery, airplane runway, tank factory etc. There's a reason why Ukraine still has reasonably reliable power after 6 years of Russian bombardment and the allies were never able to degrade German production abilities all the way down to zero despite near saturation bombing campaigns over cities like Dresden.

Bombs just aren't that powerful and our ability to produce them definitively peaked at the tail end of WWII. Currently, globally we're about at 1/20th of of that ability to produce that quantity of explosives and we likely never will reach that amount again.

The only way to actually truly destroy civilian infrastructure energetically is tactical nukes but that's an entirely other ball of wax.

In short, any time you see an expert in one field confidently expound in another field, you should be wary because, while they might be high IQ, their priors could be wrong in drastic ways that make any analysis foolish. The entire essay is arrant nonsense and would be laughed at by anyone with any degree of military analysis.

(Disclaimer: I did use AI to help me generate two numbers: the energetic ratio of WWII vs modern day high explosives and estimates of global military explosive production over time. All writing was my own).

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimean_Bridge#Attacks_after_t...

[solatic]

Your analysis presumes air power alone. Assets are seized by cavalry (in modernity, APCs and tanks) and held by infantry. Nothing new under the sun.

The only reason anybody is thinking of destroying civilian infrastructure (wealth) is because everybody took off the table the prospect of sending in cavalry and infantry to seize and hold it.

[adrian_b]

USA rightly hesitates to send in the cavalry & infantry, because there, against much more numerous opponents, it no longer has the crushing advantage that it has in air power.

The chances of success of such an action are very low, unlike for air strikes, as it has already been demonstrated by the failure of the incursion attempted by USA one week ago, which resulted in significant US material loss, e.g. the 2 scuttled transport airplanes.

[solatic]

> here, against much more numerous opponents, it no longer has the crushing advantage that it has in air power

Be careful not to compare absolute sizes of militaries (which matter in a long term, strategic sense) to the number of soldiers deployed to a specific battlefield (which matter in a short term, tactical sense, for that particular battle). Adversaries who deploy large numbers of troops into a small area make them vulnerable (to foreign air power, yes, but mainly artillery). Adversaries like Iran may have staggering military sizes on paper but their ability to deliver significant numbers of troops to a battleground, particularly when roads, airstrips, and paratrooper transports are destroyed first (by air power), is far more limited.

But you're alluding to a separate concern, which is whether the US military has enough manpower for long-term strategic purposes, particularly since we can't do much about the size of adversary militaries before wartime, but can do something about the size of our own.

> significant US military loss, e g. the 2 scuttled transport airplanes

If the loss of two measly planes is ever enough to be a "significant" military loss, then God help us. The military wastes far more, even in peacetime. We should be so lucky that the enemy continues to hurt us less than we hurt ourselves.