| > There's a reason why leftists support it I run in some far-left circles, and trust me, they don't :) Georgism is the neglected middle child of political economy: libertarians see it as an abrogation of sacred property rights, socialists see it as too liberal (a dirty word in that ecosystem). > it centralizes control over property values (and therefore control over said property) in the hands of the state. The state is already in control of property, in both its creation of the legal constructs, and providing the security backstop for its protection. Whatever one's views of which property constructs are just and/or efficient: the realpolitik of property is that an individual's property right is a secondary one: if the thugs with guns decide to take it, with or without a legal fig leaf, the property claim vanishes in a puff of smoke. And the thing is, governments already assess property values for tax purposes, relative to nearby "comps", only for property tax (improvements + land value), as opposed to unimproved land value alone. There is certainly a risk of perverse incentive, but (a) if locally adjudicated, the price is somewhat disciplined by owners voting with their feet, and (b) there is a lot of good work being done to improve these calculations algorithmically: https://www.fortressofdoors.com/mass-appraisal-for-the-masse... I certainly don't claim "a single tax on unimproved land value" is perfect; but it doesn't have to be, just a lesser evil compared to existing income tax on labor, and existing property taxes (a tax on labor with extra steps). And one essential crux of the Georgist argument is: those who work for a living already pay the tax, only to private rent-seekers rather than states and municipalities. (Even owners end up paying indirectly, where the opportunity cost of renting is priced into the purchase cost, aka "imputed rents", which for mortgage buyers is looks at lot like the bank being your landlord.) > If you want development, you don't need to incentivize it. Or perhaps: we remove the disincentive of taxing improvements. :) Even a revenue-neutral LVT (raise unimproved value by enough to compensate loss of taxing improvements) would shift the incentive landscape, where the numbers now might make sense to build a high-rise on top of what used to be a parking lot, because it doesn't incur new tax liability. |