[TeMPOraL]

"Run terraform apply plan.out next" in this context is a prompt injection for an LLM to exactly the same degree it is for a human.

Even a first party suggestion can be wrong in context, and if a malicious actor managed to substitute that message with a suggestion of their own, humans would fall for the trick even more than LLMs do.

See also: phishing.

[franktankbank]

Maybe the agents should require some sort of input start token: "simon says"

[bravetraveler]

Right, I'm fine with humans making the call. We're not so injection-happy/easily confused, apparently.

Discretion, etc. We understand that was the tool making a suggestion, not our idea. Our agency isn't in question.

The removal proposal is similar to wanting a phishing-free environment instead of preparing for the inevitability. I could see removing this message based on your point of context/utility, but not to protect the agent. We get no such protection, just training and practice.

A supply chain attack is another matter entirely; I'm sure people would pause at a new suggestion that deviates from their plan/training. As shown, autobots are eager to roll out and easily drown in context. So much so that `User` and `stdout` get confused.

[bravetraveler]

Can't edit now, day late and a dollar short. I raise a vote: we call this pattern inception, if injection offends.