[arcfour]

So everyday users should be vulnerable to bootkits and kernel-mode malware...why, exactly? That is useful security. The fact that people do not pursue this type of malware very frequently is an effect of SB proliferation. If it were not the default then these attacks would be more popular.

[account42]

Every day users care most about the files in their home directory (or cloud services these days). The OS kernel and ring 0 isn't any more important to them than that.

[jrm4]

Ooh, I like this argument a lot. Right now I'm thinking a good analogy is, you live in a gated community, but the locks on your house and your ring camera are fine -- but your overly annoying gate system makes it hard for people or deliveries to get to you etc.

[romaniv]

This is a tiresome argument that is based on a pile of unstated and rather shaky assumptions, ignores the very concept of opportunity costs and does not consider alternative solutions to the problems you seem to consider so important.

Fir starters, UEFI Secure Boot is actually rater bad at protecting users from bootkits or kernel-mode malware or anything, really. You can search this very website to get a giant list of bypasses and news about leaked vendor keys. Not to mention the fact that CrowdStrike Falcon incident had clearly demonstrated that Microsoft is more than happy to sign utterly insecure garbage.

Also, the issues with boot malware and kernel verification could be solved in many other ways, many of which are much more sensible or elegant. For example, by storing the bootloader and its keys on a physically separate read-only medium.

The issues with UEFI Secure Boot are actually the main point of the system, just like the issues with Windows executable signing are the whole point of that system.