[woodruffw]

With what keys, and how do you propose establishing trust in those keys?

(As we’ve seen from every GPG topology outside of the kinds of small trusted rings used by Linux distros and similar, there’s no obvious, trustworthy, scalable way to do decentralized key distribution.)

[lrvick]

If the keys that signed the early commits of a trusted FOSS project suddenly change without being signed by the previous keys, that should merit a higher level of consensus at release time, or waiting periods, etc.

Identity continuity at a minimum, is of immense defensive value even though we will not know if the author is human or trusted by any humans.

That said any keys that become attached to projects that are highly depended on would earn a lot of trust that they are human by getting a couple of the 5k+ of people worldwide with active well trusted PGP keys to sign theirs via conferences or otherwise, as it has always been.

[woodruffw]

> If the keys that signed the early commits of a trusted FOSS project suddenly change without being signed by the previous keys, that should merit a higher level of consensus at release time, or waiting periods, etc.

Two immediate problems: (1) package distribution has nothing to do with git (you don’t need to use any source control to publish a package on most indices, and that probably isn’t going to change), and (2) this doesn’t easily account for expiry, revocation, or the more basal reality that most people just aren’t good at key management. I think a workable design can’t make these assumptions.

> That said any keys that become attached to projects that are highly depended on would earn a lot of trust that they are human by getting a couple of the 5k+ of people worldwide with active well trusted PGP keys to sign theirs via conferences or otherwise, as it has always been.

This doesn’t scale to graphs of hundreds of thousands of maintainers, like PyPI has. I’m also not convinced it’s ever really worked on smaller scales either, except it in the less useful “nerd cred” sense.

[lrvick]

> (1) package distribution has nothing to do with git

It does in stagex, and could in any project. The same maintainer keys that sign commits and reviews are the same keys that must sign releases.

> (2) this doesn’t easily account for expiry, revocation, or the more basal reality that most people just aren’t good at key management. I think a workable design can’t make these assumptions.

I do not accept this excuse. People keep up with passports and birth certificates and you are generally not allowed to have backups of those. I for one am not going to assume that most programmers are incapable of writing down 24 english words on paper on as many backups as the need and being able to recover at least one of those in the future if needed to recover a key.

If a developer really cannot keep track of something so trivial, I absolutely do not trust them not to get their identity stolen by someone seeking to push a supply chain attack

> This doesn’t scale to graphs of hundreds of thousands of maintainers, like PyPI has. I’m also not convinced it’s ever really worked on smaller scales either, except it in the less useful “nerd cred” sense.

Say that to the 5444 PGP keys in the current web of trust that signs and maintains most packages for every major linux distribution running the bulk of the services on the internet. It works just fine.

Simply make it a hard requirement for popular dependencies and developers that cannot figure out how to type 2 commands to generate a key and put it on a smartcard, and write down a 24 word backup, should not be maintainers,

That may sound harsh, but being a maintainer of popular FOSS means an obligation to do the bare minimum to not get your identity stolen, like signing code and releases.

Last century doctors all balked at the idea of washing hands or tools between patients even though it provably resulted in better health outcomes on average.

"But look, everyone is negligent, and they are not likely to change" is not an excuse to not adopt obvious massive harm reduction with little effort.

My team and I practice everything I am preaching here and any responsible project can do the same to protect their projects even if the majority ignorantly do not.

[woodruffw]

> If a developer really cannot keep track of something so trivial, I absolutely do not trust them not to get their identity stolen by someone seeking to push a supply chain attack

For better or worse, you do trust people like this (assuming you're running a nonzero amount of Python, Ruby, Rust, or whatever else software).

> Say that to the 5444 PGP keys in the current web of trust that signs and maintains most packages for every major linux distribution running the bulk of the services on the internet. It works just fine.

That's tiny, and is exactly my point: these kinds of small rings of trust don't remotely resemble the trust topology in a free-for-all packaging ecosystem.

> "But look, everyone is negligent, and they are not likely to change" is not an excuse to not adopt obvious massive harm reduction with little effort.

This is not the argument being advanced. The argument is that we need to do better (in terms of misuse-resistance, etc.) than long-lived keys and the kinds of nerd-cred "get good" assumptions made in PGP-style webs of trust.

Nobody thinks that signing is bad; the problem is when you push the median developer to adopt it without any clear contingency plans for when, not if they fail to uphold the invariants you assume.

[lrvick]

It is clear the options are either we get better at decentralized trust and decentralized identity recovery, or we all just sit around and wait for a centralized corporation to decide what identity is online, and what minimum security level is good enough for every threat model.

Waiting for corpos to fix it has not worked in one entire forever, so I would rather lower the barrier of entry to decentralized systems that are still an IETF standard securing the backbone of the internet.

At the end of the day there are only tens of thousands of authors of globally deployed FOSS libraries and we absolutely can and must scale cryptographic identity to them to avoid supply chain attacks that hit _everything_.

Secondly, we should double down and not put all the pressure on authors. We need to make it easy for anyone with a reputable key to review and sign any FOSS code that exists. A decentralized and standardized audit system. Working on an implementation of that right now in fact.