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by igravious
72 days ago
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to justify my claim with an excerpt from the article: ““
What is type theory “Every propositional function φ(x)—so it is contended—has, in addition to its range of truth, a range of significance, i.e. a range within which x must lie if φ(x) is to be a proposition at all, whether true or false. This is the first point in the theory of types; the second point is that ranges of significance form types, i.e. if x belongs to the range of significance of φ(x), then there is a class of objects, the type of x, all of which must also belong to the range of significance of φ(x)” — Bertrand Russell - Principles of Mathematics
In the last section, we almost fell in the trap of explaining types as something that are “like sets, but… “ (e.g. they are like sets, but a term can only be a member of one type). However, while it may be technically true, any such explanation would not be at all appropriate, as, while types started as alternative to sets, they actually ended up being quite different. So, thinking in terms of sets won’t get you far. Indeed, if we take the proverbial set theorist from the previous section, and ask them about types, their truthful response would have to be: “Have you seen a set? Well, it has nothing to do with it.” [<=== important bit]
So let’s see how we define a type theory in its own right.
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Now a relation is just a particular type of predicate (ie it too is a set) so here we have x ~ y if φ(x) = y for all (x,y) in (D X C).
Notice here both the propositional function and the type are sets.