[mcintyre1994]

Nope, the most restrictive option available is to disallow tokens and require 2FA. I think that using exclusively hardware 2FA and not having the backup codes on the compromised machine probably would have prevented this attack though.

[pepve]

Someone in the linked Github thread describes an attack where the attackers waited for the victim to use their Yubikey for an AWS login, giving the attackers access to AWS as well. I don't think hardware 2FA is safe against a RAT.

[the8472]

Logins are session-based. You could tie publishing of a package to a signature from the key, then 1 tap = 1 package hash. But yeah, if the system is compromised and the attacker is doing interactive attacks they can wait for something that requires using the key and then trigger the publishing and win a race against the real prompt. To the user it might just appear like having to tap twice.