[njovin]

It can't be solved 100%, but it can be _mostly_ solved with systemic buy-in to the safety culture. Commercial aviation is a great example IMO.

We've spent the last several decades making sure that every single person trained to participate in commercial aviation (maintenance, pilots, attendants, ATC, ground crew) knows their role in the safety culture, and that each of them not only has the power but the _responsibility_ to act to prevent possible accidents.

The Swiss Cheese Model [1] does a great job of illustrating this principle and imparting the importance of each person's role in safety culture.

A big missing piece with manned space flight IMO is the lack of decision-making authority granted to lower staff. A junior pilot acting as first officer on their very first commercial flight with real passengers has the authority to call a go-around even if a seasoned Captain is flying the plane. AFAIK no such 'anyone can call a no-go' exists within NASA.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model

[pas]

Safety culture requires the ability to learn from mistakes, the capability to ground planes (without that turning into a political problem), and someone to foot the bill. (Which did not always happen, Boeing MCAS with a SPoF AoA sensor without retraining. A chain of cost-cutting decisions. And of course there were usual problems with market distorting subsidies to both Boeing and Airbus.)

NASA's missions are way too big, because the science payloads are unique, so they "can't do" launch early, launch often. And then things sit in storage for years, waiting for budget. (And manned flights are in an even worse situation of course, because they are two-way.)

And there's too much sequential dependency in the marquee projects (without enough slack to be able to absorb problems if some earlier dependent outcome is unfavorable), or in other words because of time and cost constraints the projects did not include enough proper development, testing, verification.

NASA is doing too many things, and too much of it is politics. It should be more like a grant organization, rewarding cost-efficient scientific (and engineering) progress, in a specific broad area ("spaaace!"), like the NIH (but hopefully not like the NIH).

[DennisP]

But SpaceX launches manned missions, with a perfect safety record so far, plus a fantastic success rate for their unmanned Falcon flights. They "launch early, launch often" for their test flights.

The main reason NASA can't do that with Artemis is that every SLS launch costs at least $2 billion.

[gus_massa]

> without enough slack to be able to absorb problems if some earlier dependent outcome is unfavorable

It's strange because unmanned mission are heavy in the "under promise and over deliver" territory. They may say something like "we are sending a car to Mars for a month", but everything is over engineered to last for a year. Then it miraculously work for eleven month and it's a huge success.

[pas]

I guess the conclusion is that the manned missions since the Moon landing were for Cold War reasons. (With that kind of mentality.) And when that ended they made even less sense.

For example when they had to go up to refill the wiper fluid on the Hubble in '93 it was no biggie, because as shitty as the shuttle was, it was at least reuse-minded, and there were regular missions (and budget for that). The ISS assembly coasted on the Clinton era budget surplus, but then it was evident that prancing in LEO is great for hijacking Soviet satellites, but not much else.

And compared to the Hubble the JWST was a classic Eminem mission (one shot, one opportunity ... no, wait! that's on Mars!), even if it took 5-10 more years than planned, it seems it was completely worth it.

[AndrewKemendo]

Are you just now learning about propaganda?

[gus_massa]

No, it's just strange that different parts of the same organization make oposite decisions for the propaganda.

[jdougan]

Culturally they're not really the same organization. JPL has a different culture than Goddard, which is different than Marshall, etc.

[AndrewKemendo]

No, CRM is a disaster you clearly are not in aviation. The reliability in aviation came from incredibly strict regulation and engineering improvements, NOT from structural alignment of parties. They were forced to get safer by the government if you can believe there was a time where the government did anything useful at all.

I could go off for literally hours on this topic but suffice to say I’ve done an unbelievable amount of CRM as an officer in the United States Air Force who flew on and executed 100s of combat missions in Iraq

My friends from Shell 77 are all dead because of CRM failures

Sounds like you need to watch the Rehearsal

[poopmonster]

I am suddenly reminded of a clip I saw recently of Ronald Reagan on Johnny Carson in 1975. (https://youtu.be/CNmnmdtcdcg?si=UMpkHwOVA74Nv5P7)

Reagan speaks with grandfatherly warmth about the importance of finding a middle ground between reasonable safety regulations and progress. In the same clip, he mentioned not knowing of any group with as little influence on politics as business.

Dog convinces owner to let it off leash. The rhetoric that charmed Americans into letting down their guard, in miniature.

[ethbr1]

Yes and... NASA space programs (doing rare, unknown things) are different than commercial aviation (doing a frequent, known thing with high safety). Best be careful applying solutions from the latter to the former.

Layering additional safety layers on top of a fundamentally misaligned organization process also generally balloons costs and delivery timelines (see: NASA).

The smarter play is to better align all stakeholders' incentives, from the top (including the president and Congress) to the bottom, to the desired outcome.

Right now most parties are working towards very different goals.

[randomNumber7]

Did you miss the Boeing 737max?