[lucasfin000]

The real frustrating part is that Cloudflare's "definition" of suspicious keeps changing and expanding. VPN users, privacy-first browsers, uncommon IP ranges, they all get flagged. The people most likely to get caught by these systems are exactly the ones who care most about their privacy, and not the bots that they are apparently targeting.

[gruez]

>The real frustrating part is that Cloudflare's "definition" of suspicious keeps changing and expanding.

That's... exactly expected? It's a cat and mouse game. People running botnets or AI scrapers aren't diligently setting the evil bit on their packets.

[lxgr]

So the stable state here is all humans eventually being locked out? (Bots are getting better every day; I doubt the same is true for all humans, including those with weird browsers or networks unwilling to install some dystopian Cloudflare "Internet passport".)

But hey, at least some bots are also not making it past Cloudflare!

[small_scombrus]

> So the stable state here is all humans eventually being locked out?

Yep. The most easy to implement stable state for any system where you're aiming to prevent misuse is to just prevent use

[WatchDog]

The inevitability is that these kinds of services just won't be offered without identifying yourself.

Claude's free tier requires a phone number just to try it.

[sph]

PRISM as a Service.

[kristjansson]

Or else a player too big to be blocked moves into the space with a service that provides some/all of the privacy benefits, but declines to offer the other undesirable aspects of VPN (e.g. location shifting to circumvent local restrictions)

i.e. iCloud private relay is the future

[lxgr]

I’ve already had a few services lock me out with iCloud Private Relay.

[Gormo]

To the contrary, people running botnets or AI scrapers are likely going out of their way to mimic ordinary web traffic from consumer devices. Ultimately, these measures will only affect users who are trying to protect their privacy and security, and will be ineffective at stopping bots.

[jagged-chisel]

That’s obviously because they’re not being “evil”

[Aurornis]

> The people most likely to get caught by these systems are exactly the ones who care most about their privacy, and not the bots that they are apparently targeting.

In my brief experience with abuse mitigation, connections coming from VPNs or unusual IP ranges were very significantly more likely to be associated with abuse.

It depends on your users. VPNs aren’t common at all, even though you hear about them a lot on Hacker News. For types of social sites where people got banned for abuse (forums) the first step to getting back on the forum was always to sign up for a VPN and try to reconnect. It got so bad that almost every new account connecting via VPN would reveal itself as a spammer, a banned member trying to return, or someone trying to sock puppet alternate accounts for some reason.

The worst offenders are Tor IP addresses. Anyone connecting from Tor was basically guaranteed to have bad intentions.

I heard from someone who dealt with a lot of e-mail abuse that the death threats, extortion, and other serious abuse almost always came from Protonmail or one of the other privacy-first providers that I can’t remember right now. He half-jokingly said they could likely block Protonmail entirely without impacting any real users.

It’s tough for people who want these things for privacy, but the sad reality is that these same privacy protections are favored by people who are trying to abuse services.

[frig57]

The idea that normal people don't use proton is incredibly wrong. Same with VPNs to a large extent.

I work a customer facing email job and loads of people use Proton across demographics and industries

[next_xibalba]

About what percentage of “normal people” who are email users would you estimate use Proton?

[Gormo]

> In my brief experience with abuse mitigation, connections coming from VPNs or unusual IP ranges were very significantly more likely to be associated with abuse.

Correlating these factors with abuse implies that you already have methods of identifying abuse per se, independently of these factors. Is there no feasible way of just blocking the abuse itself when it begins, or developing much more proximate indicators to act on?

> The worst offenders are Tor IP addresses. Anyone connecting from Tor was basically guaranteed to have bad intentions.

Do you handle this by blocking known Tor exit node IPs entirely, or just adding hurdles to attempts to post from those IPs?

> It’s tough for people who want these things for privacy, but the sad reality is that these same privacy protections are favored by people who are trying to abuse services.

But naturally P(A|B) and P(B|A) are two different things.

[gzread]

The solution is for more people to use Tor routinely. Like I'm doing right now.

[perching_aix]

How does the Tor network counter abuse? Like, say you're hosting a service on the Tor network, what does the Tor network offer if anything to defend against e.g. DDoS attacks?

[gzread]

It's a solution for users because you can't afford to demand ID from your users (such as an IP address) if all your users quit when you do that.

[perching_aix]

Sure, but if the service keeps getting overwhelmed (financially or traffic-wise) or compromised (not even necessarily in the security sense but in the semantic purpose sense, like via spam floods on a message board) due to a lessened capability to combat abuse, then the user is worse off all over again, no?

All it would solve then is laundering Tor traffic from being probably malicious to being reputationally ambiguous. Though for a within-network service, that's probably assumed anyways - hard to run a Tor service if you assume all Tor users are malicious, that would be nonsensical.

[whatisthiseven]

Which VPNs are people using that actually care about the user's privacy? Most of them don't, sell their home IP to buyers, sell their DNS history to others, etc. Worse, some of them could require invasive MITM cert stuff most users will just click yes through.

I have yet to see a use case for VPNs for the casual internet audience, and for a tech savvy user, their better off renting through some datacenter or something, which at that point is hardly a VPN and more home IP obfuscation. All the same downsides, and at least you get real privacy.

[traceroute66]

> Which VPNs are people using that actually care about the user's privacy?

Mullvad.

It has been proven in a court of law that when Mullvad says "no logging", they mean it.

They also regularly have security audits and publish the results[2][3]

[1]https://mullvad.net/en/blog/mullvad-vpn-was-subject-to-a-sea... [2]https://mullvad.net/en/blog/new-security-audit-of-account-an... [3]https://mullvad.net/en/blog/successful-security-assessment-o...

[thisisnow]

Second for Mullvad, I am quite distrusting in general but more I know about Mullvad, more I am convinced they really are serious about user privacy

[monista]

I don't use the VPN, but I still happily use their privacy-oriented (Firefox-based) Mullvad browser.

https://github.com/mullvad/mullvad-browser/

[mahmoudimus]

Seconding Mullvad. I am paranoid and I think they're trustworthy

[evilduck]

Using any popular datacenter's IP range for a personal VPN is likely to be outright blocked.

[Imustaskforhelp]

Also you only get 1 IP so its not really anonymous and you definitely would have a fingerprint.

[thisisnow]

you just rotate it?

[lxgr]

I'm forced to use a VPN to occasionally check my US bank account, since a foreign IP address is obviously a harbinger of unspeakable evil (while the friendly Youtube advertised neighborhood VPN is obviously evidence of pure intentions).

[Imustaskforhelp]

ProtonVPN with bitcoin which you get from a monero swap is a good idea for complete privacy if you want port forwarding.

MullvadVPN is also another great one.

I have heard some good things about AirVPN, but I can absolutely attest for mullvad and to a degree ProtonVPN (Just with Proton, depending upon your threat model, do make the necessary precautions like buying with monero for example)

There are others, but mostly its the 2-3 that I trust.

[lxgr]

How do you square "complete privacy" with the fact that you're authenticating to these VPNs with a persistent username or other credential and are then sending traffic through them, both from an IP address that might identify you, and to services that you authenticate against?

Best case, the VPN learns your residential IP and the names of every HTTPS host you connect to (if not your entire DNS traffic as well); worst case, they collude with any of the services you use (or some ad tracker they embed) and persistently deanonymize your account.

VPNs are structurally not great for privacy.

[Gormo]

> How do you square "complete privacy" with the fact that you're authenticating to these VPNs with a persistent username or other credential and are then sending traffic through them, both from an IP address that might identify you, and to services that you authenticate against?

IIRC, Mullvad allows anonymous accounts, allows payment in cash and via other methods that don't link PII to the transaction, and claims not to log inbound connections.

[gruez]

>Most of them don't, sell their home IP to buyers, sell their DNS history to others, etc. Worse, some of them could require invasive MITM cert stuff most users will just click yes through.

Source? I haven't seen any evidence that the major paid VPN providers engage in any of those things. At best it's vague implications something shady is happening because one of the key people was previously at [shady organization].

[ymolodtsov]

Yes, using an incognito windows is more than enough to kick off their checks.