Hacker News new | ask | show | jobs
by ordu 84 days ago
> Ultimately ID requires either a government ID service, a third party corporate ID service,

These are valid approaches to the problem, but they are not necessary.

> or some kind of open hybrid - which doesn't exist.

PGP exists for decades. It doesn't have a great UX, it isn't used outside of its narrow niches, but it exists and does exactly this.

2 comments

Picture this: your grandma calls you in a panic, and you tell her, "Drop me your public PGP key so I can verify the signature".. PGP is dead outside of niche geek circles exactly because key management is basically an unsolvable problem for the average person
> PGP is dead outside of niche geek circles exactly because key management is basically an unsolvable problem for the average person

Can this problem be solved with better software?

I believe it can, it is just average person doesn't need PGP. No demand for software solving this problem, therefore no software for that.

The problem can be solved, like a storage for known PGP public keys with their history: like where the key was acquired, and a simple algo that calculated trust to the key as a probability of it being valid (or what adjective cryptographers would use in this case?).

You can start with PGP keys of people you know, getting them as QR codes offline, marking them as "high trust" and then pull from them keys stored at their devices (lowering their trust levels by the way). There are some issues how to calculate probability, because when we pull some keys from different sources we can't know are their reported trust levels are independent variables or not, but I believe you can deal with it, by pulling the whole chain of transfers of the key, starting from the owner of the key and ending at your device.

It is just a rough idea, how it can be made. Maybe other solutions are possible. My point is: the ugliness of PGP is a result of PGP was made by nerds and for the nerds. There is no demand for PGP-like solutions outside of nerd communities. But maybe LLM induced corrosion of trust will create demand?

What you're describing (hidden key exchanges with Trust-On-First-Use) is exactly what Signal and WhatsApp already do - they just hid all the math under the hood and tied it to your phone number. A pure Web of Trust where normal people have to manually weigh probabilities is never going to take off. The average user will blindly click "Accept Risk and Continue" on literally any certificate warning just to get back to looking at pictures of their grandkids
PGP works if you vouch for keys in person, both of you are honest and can be trusted to act in good faith when not in person, have good key chain and rotation hygiene, and the private keys can't be exfiltrated.
Yeah, there is no silver bullet solving the problem of trust completely and perfectly. People can lie and we can make them stop, while everything else is just a workaround.

The point of GP was that there any such system will require a central authority, PGP shows that you don't need it. I didn't claimed that PGP is a perfect or good enough solution, just that it exists and works for some people.

> both of you are honest and can be trusted to act in good faith when not in person

I believe it is not strictly necessary for the scheme to work. It is a limitation of OpenPGP and other implementations that they do not allow convert multiple independent observation of a public key (finding it from different sources, or encountering them used to sign messages) into a measure of trust to the key.

It is not a silver bullet either, but it can alleviate the problem and make it tractable.

The only doubts I have is how this system will stand against multiple actors trying to undermine it, but still I believe you can get something that will be better than nothing, and probably better than a central authority.