[scarier]

(1) Why do you think this is worse for the Chinese government than the US? Also, this view of the strategic goals of the war seems fundamentally incompatible with both how it began and the ongoing US government narratives about it.

(2) I think we all (the author included) agree with you that it's easier to break things than to build them--both hardware and relationships--so it's obvious that maintaining trade through these kinds of choke points requires some degree of cooperation on all fronts. Iran does have a geographic advantage over other players, though (partial exceptions to Oman and the UAE), as well as a clear acute interest in constricting traffic through the strait. Sure, it may be bleeding them, but it seems to be one of the few ways they can meaningfully attack their enemies. It'll be interesting to see if anyone has the will to force the strait open against Iran's efforts.

Generally agree on Ukraine/Taiwan and the bigger geopolitical picture though.

[AYBABTME]

(1) China is more sensitive to shipping and oil shipments (and derivatives) than the US. It hurts both but China much more. The US is hurt in so far as high gas price are bad for elections, a small price to pay for strategic advantage.

(2) Iran has a temporary but unsustainable interest in constricting traffic, and it's not the only country who could impose a filter there. The mere credible threat of a strike on shipping is enough to stop it, so other countries basically have an equivalent capability to restrict traffic. And all countries, including Iran, are unable to sustain a prolonged closure. The current situation is an unstable, non-equilibrium situation for Iran and it's neighbors.

Overall, all of it doesn't really matter to the US because simply taking Iran off the supply chain of China is good for them. They spin the narrative about starting the war for a variety of other reasons so that they can justify the pain it inflicts on their allies (Korea, Japan - very dependent on those hydrocarbons too, and EU) and choke China's oil supplies without looking intentional. Last time the US overtly blockaded an asian nation's oil supplies, Pearl Harbour happened.

Which is another reason why China had such a structural incentive to move toward solar power, battery storage and renewables in general while also powering most of their early growth with dirty power plants.

I think Trump wants to be remembered for having neutered the China threat and having restored American supremacy and dynamism, and doesn't care too much about what it will cost at the next federal elections. I think he cares more about his legacy and wanting to be remembered as a historical figure on the strategic level. He's portrayed as being merely a fool with self interested dictatorial tendencies but I think attributing such simple intentions to him is self deception and leads to poor analysis. It doesn't pay to trivialize figures for disliking them or their actions.

Without taking camp here, I'll say that taking Trump for a fool is shortsighted, in my opinion.

[rixed]

It's also fair to play with the idea that the whole US political establishment understood this, and agree with the plan, thus why the Dems have stayed so silent on those matters.

[scarier]

(1) Sure, I'm not arguing that the Chinese economy is less vulnerable to a SOH closure than the US. I do think the US government is much more vulnerable to economic pressure than the Chinese government is (especially in an election year that even before the war was shaping up poorly for the ruling party), and any calculus the government makes needs to include this. If this was the goal of the war, I think we would also see significantly different targeting and messaging than we do now. If there was a ceasefire tomorrow, it's unclear that China would be the outsize loser here.

(2) Again, sure, but Iran can clearly sustain it longer. They've read their Clausewitz and properly understand this as a contest of political will, which they have much deeper reserves of than capital or munitions. Anyone with any power in the Iranian regime knows they have no offramp.

Absolutely agree that Trump cares strongly for his legacy, maybe more than anything except for his self-image, but the most important part of that legacy is being recognized as both popular and a winner--I would argue that these are far more important to him personally than US power and influence on the world stage (shutting down USAID, for example, was a massive blow to US soft power, and the NATO infighting that he initiated is still probably a net negative for US hard power, even if it has had a positive impact on European defense spending and self-sufficiency). He also clearly wants to see that legacy established in his lifetime (hence the obsession with having things named after him). It's hard to imagine this being a particularly effective way to increase long-term US power and influence relative to China, particularly in a way that will generate positive sentiment within the US--especially among the majority voters who favored his populist-isolationist political platform.

[shykes]

Great analysis. Thank you.

[physicles]

I’d love for it to be true that Trump isn’t just a narcissistic buffoon. Where are you frequently finding evidence of this?