[ashishb]

> It's very painful to sandbox software from the outside and it's radically less effective because your sandbox is always maximally permissive.

Not really.

Let's say I am running `~/src/project1 $ litellm`

Why does this need access to anything outside of `~/src/project1`?

Even if it does, you should expose exactly those particular directories (e.g. ~/.config) and nothing else.

[staticassertion]

How are you setting that sandbox up? I've laid out numerous constraints - x-platform support is non-existent for sandboxing, sandboxing requires privileges to perform, whole-program sandboxing is fundamentally weaker, maintenance of sandboxing is best done by developers, etc.

> Even if it does, you should expose exactly those particular directories (e.g. ~/.config) and nothing else.

Yes, but now you are in charge of knowing every potential file access, network access, or possibly even system call, for a program that you do not maintain.

[ashishb]

> Yes, but now you are in charge of knowing every potential file access, network access, or possibly even system call, for a program that you do not maintain.

Not really. I try to capture the most common ones for caching [1], but if I miss it, then it is just inefficient, as it is equivalent to a cache miss.

I'll emphasize again, "no linter/scanner/formatter (e.g., trivy) should need full disk access".

1 - https://github.com/ashishb/amazing-sandbox/blob/fddf04a90408...

[staticassertion]

Okay, so you're using docker. Cool, that's one of the only x-plat ways to get any sandboxing. Docker itself is privileged and now any unsandboxed program on your computer can trivially escalate to root. It also doesn't limit nearly as much as a dev-built sandbox because it has to isolate the entire process.

Have you solved for publishing? You'll need your token to enter the container or you'll need an authorizing proxy. Are cache volumes shared? In that case, every container is compromised if one is. All of these problems and many more go away if the project is built around them from the start.

It's perfectly nice to wrap things up in docker but there's simply no argument here - developers can write sandboxes for their software more effectively because they can architect around the sandbox, you have to wrap the entire thing generically to support its maximum possible privileges.

[ashishb]

> Docker itself is privileged and now any unsandboxed program on your computer can trivially escalate to root.

Inside the sandbox but not on my machine. Show me how it can access an unmounted directory.

> Have you solved for publishing? You'll need your token to enter the container or you'll need an authorizing proxy.

Amazing-sandbox does not solve for that. The current risk is contamination; if you are running `trivy`, it should not need access to tokens in a different env/directory.

> All of these problems and many more go away if the project is built around them from the start.

Please elaborate on your approach that will all me to run markdown/JS/Python/Go/Rust linters and security scanners. Remember that `trivy` which caused `litellm` compromise is a security scanner itself.

> developers can write sandboxes for their software more effectively because they can architect around the sandbox,

Yeah, let's ask 100+ linter providers to write sandboxes for you. I can't even get maintainers to respond to legitimate & trivial PRs many a time.

[sellmesoap]

> Inside the sandbox but not on my machine. Show me how it can access an unmounted directory.

So it says right on the tin of my favorite distro: 'Warning: Beware that the docker group membership is effectively equivalent to being root! Consider using rootless mode below.' So # docker run super-evil-oci-container with a bind mount or two and your would-be attacker doesn't need to guess your sudo password.

[imtringued]

What's particularly vexing is that there is this agentic sandboxing software called "container-use" and out of the box it requires you to add a user to the docker group because they haven't thought about what that really means and why running docker in that configuration option shouldn't be allowed, but instead they have made it mandatory as a default.

[ashishb]

> docker run super-evil-oci-container

  1. That super evil OCI container still needs to find a vulnerability in Docker
  2. You can run Docker in rootless mode e.g. Orbstack runs without root

[staticassertion]

I'm not going to code review your sandbox project for you.