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The ENIAC team’s decision to spin off and incorporate was surely pushed along by how they got screwed multiple times by the academics - Goldstine and Von Neumann, plus the university itself. It’s easier to celebrate the free publishing of ideas if your name is at least going to be on the paper. It seems like you’re not trying particularly hard to avoid the idea of “monetizing” the computer to sound pejorative. It was the creation of the computer _industry_ that transformed the world and established the import of computers, was it not? You were never getting there without monetization. What good is the spread of ideas if someone, somewhere doesn’t eventually start selling computers? This grates especially hard given that the academics were the ones who acted unscrupulously by lifting their ideas and publicizing them without permission or credit. (“Leaked” is a charitable way to say “deliberately disseminated without caution”). I agree the stored program is important, but the stored program is of ENIAC vintage, even if it wasn’t implemented on it. And Eckert and Mauchly definitively came to this idea before the involvement of Von Neumann. The thing is, they had an obligation to finish the machine they had promised to build for the army before pursuing such a major redesign. So all they COULD do was informally collect their ideas for a 2.0. Von Neumann arrives, absorbs what they’re up to, synthesizes it (including ‘the big idea’ that ENIAC was missing), and the rest is history. That synthesis is published without their names, and that is why we talk about the Von Neumann architecture. Look, I’m sure it’s true that the crispness of that paper can be attributed to Von Neumann, but it’s a non-sequitur to assume that Eckert and Mauchly’s ideas were jumbled. They were at least organized enough to be building a working machine in the background, and if we’re going to argue that the important thing was promulgation of enough information for others to replicate, than the practicum is more important than mathematical tidiness. In fact, if we’re talking about how the ideas spread, the paper is frankly overblown. The Moore school lectures were really what caused the Cambrian explosion of electronic computing. There, you can find Eckert and Mauchly utterly central to the elucidation of how to build a general purpose electronic computer. And hey look, there they are, deliberately sharing the ideas out to interested practitioners, in a more pragmatic and direct way than the paper. What I’m building to here is that E&M starting a company was not evidence that they were just out to make a buck. On the contrary, what it shows is that they had _foresight_ about what the next interesting chapter was bound to be. With the Moore School Lecrures, the ‘publishing of the ideas’ stage was over - the next step was to begin building more machines that could do more computation for more users. And while there was plenty that happened afterward to refine the theoretical model, they were absolutely correct that that’s where the action was. In fact, I think that if you look at what many of these proposed fathers of computing did next, it’s an excellent litmus test of how central they actually were. Some of the sillier ones like Atanasoff just forget about their supposed invention and go on with life - that’s a tell that they weren’t that interested in general-purpose, high speed computing. Whereas E&M’s follow-on work was to advance the field even in the face of great setback. This also completely deconstructs the idea that they were just thinking about artillery, or just thinking about weather. They were thinking about _computing_, and their careers afterwards demonstrate this. |